2025年8月14日 星期四

/馬奎斯:《百年孤獨》Kenzaburō Ōe (大江 健三郎, Ōe Kenzaburō; 1935 – 2023) Denying History Disables Japan.否認歷史使日本無力應對作者:大江健三郎. NYT Magazine. 19950702

2025

「深夜渴醒時,能自己起來倒杯水;那天疼痛加重時,能自己摸到藥瓶;掛斷電話後能記得孩子剛才講了些什麼……」 。能閱讀,是生活的小確辛。
:/馬奎斯:《百年孤獨》


我對書的銷售等有興趣。昨天注意到皇冠出版社的一策略是專攻近代文學名著,譬如說這本長銷名作的翻譯出版。近十來年此書每年二刷。//
今晨我在紐約時報讀二篇,最新的訃聞是英國AI哲學名家Biden八八歲過世。查部落格「書與人」關於她,在2014年BBC訪談的話被紐約時報訃聞引用….創造力與AI。
考古題是大江Oe 的,日本因不道歉賠償等,所以無法理直氣壯……長崎原子彈的第三種解釋。




石破茂在 8 月 15 日全國戰亡者追悼儀式的致詞中表示,「決不能再走錯路。必須再次深刻銘記那場戰爭的反省與教訓」,並在相隔 13 年後,重提對先前大戰的「反省」一詞。 自 1994 年村山富市首相提出「深刻反省」以來,歷任首相至 2012 年的野田佳彥皆在致詞中提及「反省」。但自 2013 年安倍晉三任內開始,此詞從致詞中消失,對亞洲各國的加害責任也不再明確觸及,之後的菅義偉與岸田文雄也未使用。 至於「教訓」一詞,岸田在 2022 至 2024 年的致詞中,延續安倍政權時戰後 70 年談話的內容,使用「深刻銘記歷史的教訓」。這次石破採用「反省」,被視為更進一步的表述,也展現了他的個人風格。 石破身邊人士解釋,「反省」並不限於對亞洲的加害,還包括回顧導致戰爭的經過,以及戰後文人統制(civilian control)的運作方式等,是石破特別重視的部分。 雖然「決不重演戰爭悲劇」的表述與歷任首相大致相同,但石破強調,「在過去 80 年間,我國始終作為和平國家前行,並致力於世界的和平與繁榮」,並表明要將「沉痛的戰爭記憶與對不戰的堅定誓言跨世代傳承,持續為永久和平而行動」。 參考資料:每日新聞


--- Denying History Disables Japan.否認歷史使日本無力應對作者:大江健三郎. NYT Magazine
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/02/magazine/denying-history-disables-japan.html




1960年6月,在北京,我正坐在毛澤東對面。我們去他辦公室時穿過的院子裡,木蘭花在午夜的黑暗中泛著白色的光輝,散發著濃鬱的香氣,而這正是我記憶中最深刻的。加西亞·馬奎斯多麼巧妙地再現了當時的場景!

毛澤東只說了一些話,就連我這個25歲、並非他最熱心讀者的人,也聽得出是他本人著作中的引文。他身旁坐著周恩來,他的臉沒有朝向我們,而是朝向毛澤東,毛澤東說話的語氣彷彿在為他的老戰友追憶往昔。每當毛澤東不停地抽煙,伸手去拿一聽熊貓牌香煙時,周恩來都會輕輕地把它推開。

這次午夜訪談是為了鼓勵我們這些從東京來的作家,作為那些正在「抗爭」美日安保條約的日本「人民」的代表——儘管我們是否真正代表這些「人民」這一點值得懷疑。我們這些無辜的客人,在訪問期間每天都圍坐在擺滿食物的餐桌旁,卻不知道這是自革命以來最嚴重的歉收和飢荒之年。我們也參觀了南京城外的一個人民集體,聽一位老人講述他如何在被日軍屠殺的農民中,靠著躲在屍山之下而倖存下來,以及他至今仍承受著這份創傷。

假設我直接面對中國人,不是在毛主席的接待室,不是在文化官僚領導的人民集體,而是在一個被日軍戰靴夷為平地的村莊。我會受到怎樣的對待?侵略中國的並非只有軍隊。許多平民也來到大陸,夢想建立新的生活。日本戰敗後,許多人回到祖國後拋棄了自己的孩子。其中一些不幸的孩子倖存了下來,被中國農民收養。當時我也不知道他們的事。

IN BEIJING, IN JUNE 1960, I WAS SITTING ACROSS FROM MAO Zedong. In the courtyard through which we had walked to his office, magnolias were white in the midnight darkness, emitting a heavy scent, and that is what has remained most deeply in my memory. How skillfully Garcia Marquez might recreate the scene!

Mao Zedong said only things that even I, at 25 and not his most enthusiastic reader, could tell consisted of quotations from his own writings. By his side sat Zhou Enlai, turned not toward us but toward Mao, who spoke as if he were remembering things of the past for his old comrade. Each time Mao, who smoked incessantly, reached for a can of Giant Panda brand cigarettes, Zhou would gently push it slightly away.

This midnight interview was to encourage us writers who had come from Tokyo as representatives -- though it was doubtful we were truly representative -- of the Japanese "people" who were "struggling" against the United States-Japan security treaty. We the innocent guests sat down on every day of our visit to a table loaded with food, not knowing it was the year of the worst crop failure and starvation since the Revolution. We also visited a people's collective outside Nanjing and heard an old man tell how, amid the peasants being slaughtered by the Japanese Army, he had survived by hiding under a mountain of corpses, and how he still carried this trauma.

Suppose I had directly faced the Chinese, not in Chairman Mao's reception room, not in a people's collective guided by a cultural bureaucrat, but in a village leveled by Japanese army boots. How would I have been treated? The army was not alone in invading China. A great many civilians also went to the continent, dreaming of establishing a new life. After Japan's defeat, many of these people, returning to their homeland, abandoned their children. Some of these unfortunate children survived, adopted by Chinese farmers. At the time I did not know about them, either.

Advertiseme

日本政府的基本態度──中國痛恨的是日本軍隊的所作所為,而不是日本人民──始終如一。毋庸置疑,這不過是個巨大的謊言。中國人記得他們殘酷的經歷,他們那段代代相傳的故事不可能被遺忘。類似的事情也發生在韓國、台灣、菲律賓以及亞洲其他地區。在亞洲的前殖民地,像荷蘭人這樣的歐洲人所經歷的苦難也不容忽視。而這一切都與美國人偷襲珍珠港的遭遇疊加在一起。日本政府想要的遺忘怎麼可能實現呢?

今年年初,我與詩人金致夏和其他韓國知識分子在首爾參加了一個會議。在那裡,我表達了希望,儘管日本尚未完成對韓國人民的賠償,但應該嘗試為兩國人民建立共同的未來。韓國的回應是,他們承認有些日本人有良知,但他們永遠是少數。

會後,我獲得了一個對日本小說家來說難得的機會──向首爾市民發表演說。演講結束後,第一個問題是:我們歡迎廣島和長崎原子彈爆炸,它終結了日本軍國主義,我們現在仍然如此。我們無法理解你們為什麼批評原子彈爆炸。如果你們拒絕賠償韓國“慰安婦”,又如何談論原子彈受害者的苦難呢?韓國原子彈受害者又該如何?

韓國和日本公民進行此類對話的機會仍然有限,日本和朝鮮民主主義人民共和國公民的對話機會就更少了。中日兩國公民之間的直接交流非常少。中國人拒絕對話是意料之中的,但從日本人複雜而又矛盾的思維中也能看出某種程度的拒絕。

中國曾經一度興起一股令人矚目的新文學,似乎有潛力重塑整個亞洲文學。然而,天安門事件終結了這一切。美國接納了那些為了逃避壓製而離開中國的作家,並視其為政治難民;它也為那些選擇留下的作家提供了支持。而日本及其知識分子則對此無能為力。

此外,日本作為一個國家,並未直接處理中國壓制言論的問題。更糟的是,日本知識分子——尤其是那些對日本所犯下的罪行記憶猶新的知識分子——認為他們無權批評中國的文化政策。

日本未能承擔其應有的角色,也體現在其政府和科學家拒絕就中國快速經濟發展政策造成的環境破壞向中國提供坦誠的建議,儘管日本經歷了歷史上最嚴重的環境災難之一,並成功地應對了這些災難。日本政府只想著日本的經濟繁榮,而知識分子則認為他們無權公開批評中國自行選擇的經濟政策。我懷疑,這種情緒也延伸到了他們對中國地下核子試驗的態度。

日本知識分子認為日本對中國的補償並不徹底,認為日本未能重新開始,未能與鄰國實現真正的和解,扭曲了日本的自我形象。我無意貶低在亞洲各國從事志願服務的日本醫生、工程師和年輕人的努力,但即使是這些令人欽佩的日本人,也並非完全擺脫了心理創傷,而這些創傷無法透過道德奉獻來治癒。

為了讓日本人能夠將21世紀的亞洲視為一個可以真正合作的地區,而不是一個與西方競爭的新興經濟強國,他們必須先建立一個能夠批評鄰國並反過來被批評的基礎。為此,日本必須為其侵略行為道歉並做出補償。這是基本條件,大多數有良知的日本人都支持這一點。但由保守黨、官僚和商界領袖組成的聯盟對此表示反對。

這項關於日本二戰行為懺悔的決議本應是為戰爭給亞洲國家帶來的災難道歉,但卻被淡化了。這很可能加劇了人們對日本的不信任。

The basic attitude of the Japanese Government -- that China hated what the military of Japan had done, but not the Japanese people -- was maintained with thorough consistency. Needless to say, it was a gigantic fiction. The Chinese remember their brutal experiences and their stories of that time, told from generation to generation, cannot possibly fade away. Similar things happened in Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and the rest of Asia. There are also, in the former colonies in Asia, the hardships of Europeans like the Dutch to be reckoned with. And all this is superimposed on what happened to the Americans in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. How can the forgetfulness that the Japanese Government wants be possible?

Early this year I was at a conference in Seoul with the poet Kim Chi Ha and other Korean intellectuals. There I expressed the hope that though the Japanese have not finished compensating the Korean people, some attempts should be made to construct a common future for both peoples. The Korean response was that they recognized some Japanese had a conscience, but that they would forever remain a minority.

After the conference, I was given a rare opportunity for a Japanese novelist -- to address citizens of Seoul. When my speech was done, the first question was: We welcomed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that brought an end to Japanese militarism, and we still do. We cannot understand why you are critical of the bombings. If you refuse to compensate the Korean "comfort women," how can you talk about the miseries of the atomic victims? What about the Korean atomic victims?

There still are only limited opportunities for citizens of the Republic of Korea and Japan to hold such a dialogue, even less for citizens of Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. There is very little direct exchange between Chinese and Japanese citizens. That the Chinese would refuse a dialogue is to be expected, but a certain refusal can also be seen in the Japanese people's complicated, refracted thinking.

For a time there was a remarkable new literature in China that seemed to have the potential for remaking all of Asian literature. Then the incident in Tiananmen Square ended it. The United States has accepted as political refugees the writers who left China to escape the suppression; it has also provided support for those who chose to stay. Japan and its intellectuals haven't done much.

Among other things, Japan as a nation hasn't directly dealt with the suppression of speech in China. Worse, Japanese intellectuals -- especially those with memories of the crimes Japan committed -- feel they have no right to criticize China for its cultural policy.

Japan's failure to assume its proper role is also evident in the refusal of its Government and scientists to offer candid advice to China on the environmental destruction it has brought upon itself as a result of its policy of rapid economic development, even though Japan has experienced one of the worst environmental disasters and successfully dealt with it. The Government thinks only of Japan's economic prosperity, while intellectuals feel they have no right to criticize openly the economic policy China has chosen for itself. This sentiment extends, I suspect, to their attitude toward China's underground nuclear tests.

The sense among Japanese intellectuals that Japan's compensations to the Chinese are incomplete, their feeling that Japan has not managed to make a fresh start, to effect a true reconciliation with its neighbors, distorts Japan's self-image. I have no intention of belittling the efforts of Japanese physicians, engineers and young people who do volunteer work in various countries of Asia, but even these admirable Japanese are not entirely free of psychological scars, which can't be healed through moral dedication.

FOR THE JAPANESE TO BE ABLE TO REGARD 21ST-CENTURY ASIA not as a new economic power rivaling the West but as a region in which Japan can be a true partner, they must first establish a basis that would enable them to criticize their neighbors and be criticized in turn. For this, Japan must apologize for its aggression and offer compensation. This is the basic condition, and most Japanese with a good conscience have been for it. But a coalition of conservative parties, bureaucrats and business leaders opposes it.

The resolution of remorse for Japanese conduct during World War II was supposed to apologize for the calamities the war brought to Asian nations, but it was watered down. And this most likely confirmed distrust of Japan.



But the feelings of the Japanese people are expressed by a 75-year-old woman. Her husband left her, pregnant, 10 months after they were married, and was killed in Burma, where some of the fiercest battles were fought. Her house and everything she possessed were then destroyed in an air raid. She wrote to a newspaper: "The Association of the Families of the War Dead and the opposition groups in the Diet say things like, 'This was a war of self-defense that Japan fought against its will' and 'If we admit that we were the invaders, we are saying that those killed in battle died useless deaths. But our husbands were persuaded by the militarists that they were dying for the Emperor and for the country, and were herded into battlefields without knowing they were engaged in an invasion. The Government committed aggression; our husbands were its victims."

Each time my handicapped son was burdened with a new difficulty, my family and I passionately worked for his rehabilitation. Japan and the Japanese must work for rehabilitation in Asia. In the history of our modernization in general but, in particular, in the war of aggression that was its peak, we lost the right to be a part of Asia and have continued to live without recovering that right.

Without that rehabilitation we shall never be able to eradicate the ambivalence in our attitude toward our neighbors, the feeling that our relationships aren't real. If I believe these feelings might nonetheless be overcome, it is not because I expect our Government to change its attitude drastically, but because I find that true remorse is quietly but deeply internalized among common people.

What about the rest of the world? The virtual suspension by the Smithsonian Institution of an exhibition on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the apologies that institution offered to the Japan Veterans Association and others for accepting such an exhibition in the first place -- these irritated the Japanese Government. Independent of this, victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki protested. President Clinton's statement that he has no intention of apologizing to Japan because President Truman was correct in deciding to drop the atomic bombs prompted more protests. But even if President Clinton had apologized, how much consolation would that have given to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Indeed, if he were ever to apologize, should he not do so to the children of his country, now and in the future, and the children of the world, and do this because our planet is still haunted by nuclear annihilation?

If I am ever given a chance, there's something I'd like say to the Smithsonian Institution. In the past 50 years, two distinct views have taken root in Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the view of these two cities as embodying the awesome power of nuclear weapons and the view of them as embodying the ultimate tragedies that mankind has suffered. I'd like to offer a third: Hiroshima and Nagasaki as embodying mankind's ability to recover from the most horrible destruction.

但一位75歲的老婦人卻表達了日本人民的感受。她丈夫在婚後10個月拋棄了懷孕的她,並在緬甸陣亡,那裡曾是戰火最激烈的地方之一。她的房子和所有家當都在一次空襲中被摧毀。她寫信給一家報紙說:“戰死者家屬協會和國會中的反對派團體聲稱,‘這是一場日本違背自身意願進行的自衛戰爭’,‘如果我們承認自己是侵略者,那就等於說那些戰死沙場的人是無謂的犧牲。但我們的丈夫卻被軍國主義者欺騙,以為他們是為天皇和國家而死,在戰場政府的情況下被趕了上戰場政府的丈夫。


每當我殘疾的兒子麵臨新的困境時,我和我的家人都會滿懷熱情地為他的康復努力。日本和日本人民必須為亞洲的復興而努力。在我們整個現代化過程中,尤其是在達到頂峰的侵略戰爭中,我們失去了作為亞洲一部分的權利,並且一直活在無法恢復這項權利的陰影下。


如果沒有這種復興,我們將永遠無法消除我們對鄰國的矛盾態度,以及那種認為我們之間的關係不真實的感覺。如果我相信這些感覺最終能夠被克服,那並非因為我期望我們的政府會徹底改變其態度,而是因為我發現真正的悔恨正在普通民眾心中悄然而深刻地內化。


世界其他地方呢?史密森尼學會實際上暫停了廣島和長崎原子彈爆炸展覽,並就當初接受此類展覽向日本退伍老兵協會和其他機構道歉——這些都激怒了日本政府。除此之外,廣島和長崎的受害者也發起了抗議。柯林頓總統表示,他無意向日本道歉,因為杜魯門總統投放原子彈的決定是正確的。這起言論引發了更多抗議。但即使柯林頓總統道歉,又能為廣島和長崎的受害者帶來多少安慰呢?事實上,如果他真的要道歉,難道不該向他國家的子孫後代道歉,向全世界的子孫後代道歉嗎?因為我們的星球仍然飽受核毀滅的陰影籠罩,他應該道歉嗎?


如果有機會,我想對史密森尼學會說幾句話。在過去的50年裡,兩種截然不同的觀點在廣島和長崎紮根:一種觀點認為這兩座城市體現了核武的可怕威力,另一種觀點認為它們體現了人類遭受的終極悲劇。我想提出第三種觀點:廣島和長崎體現了人類從最可怕的毀滅中恢復的能力。

Finally, a word about Nagasaki. This southern city is remarkable for the many Christian believers among its citizens. Long suppressed during the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Christians in this city were permitted to express their faith openly soon after the Meiji Restoration, in 1868, and, though persecution continued, they began to build a church in Urakami, where the greatest martyrdom had occurred. The atomic bomb destroyed the beautifully completed church, killing 8,500 Christians.

Today the Urakami Catholic Church has been rebuilt. With the rebuilding, the surviving atomic victims are trying to move their recovery into something larger so that they may pass their faith on to those who are to come in the next century. Will this not be accepted as a common experience by Catholics all over the world and render irrelevant the national confrontation between the United States and Japan? Will it not enable us to go beyond the atomic bomb both as the embodiment of destructive power and the embodiment of human tragedy and see in it the living proof of man's ability to recover that gives hope to our planet? And will this not serve as a humane model for Japan, which had once lost its way in war -- for its rehabilitation in Asia and in the world?


最後,談談長崎。這座南方城市以其眾多的基督教徒而聞名。德川幕府時期,這座城市的基督徒長期遭受壓制,直到1868年明治維新後不久,才獲準公開表達信仰。儘管迫害仍在繼續,他們還是開始在浦上——歷史上最偉大的殉道者發生的地方——建造教堂。原子彈摧毀了這座精美的教堂,造成8500名基督徒死亡。


如今,浦上天主教堂已重建。隨著重建的進行,倖存的原子彈受害者正努力將他們的重建工作推向更大的規模,以便將他們的信仰傳遞給下個世紀的後人。這難道不會被全世界天主教徒視為共同的經歷,並使美日之間的國家對抗變得無關緊要嗎?這是否能讓我們超越原子彈作為毀滅力量和人類悲劇的化身這一概念,而從中看到人類復興能力的鮮活證明,為地球帶來希望?這是否能為曾經在戰爭中迷失方向的日本在亞洲乃至世界復興提供一個人道主義的榜樣?



enzaburō Ōe


Wikiquote
https://en.wikiquote.org › wiki › Kenzaburō_Ōe



Kenzaburō Ōe (大江 健三郎, Ōe Kenzaburō; 31 January 1935 – 3 March 2023) was a Japanese author and a major figure in contemporary Japanese literature.

沒有留言:

網誌存檔