Great powers should have a combination of hard and soft power — the power to compel and the power to attract, in Joseph Nye’s famous formulation. What today’s China has is brittle power: power with too much hardness and not enough capacity to bend or adapt. Sooner or later, it is destined to shatter.
根據約瑟夫·奈著名的表述，大國應該兼具硬實力和軟實力——也就是強制力和吸引力。而今天的中國擁有的是一種 「脆實力」：這種力量硬度有餘，但缺乏彎曲或適應的能力。遲早，它註定會破碎。
1938年的「美國藝術三百年」（Three Centuries of American Art）是紐約現代美術館史上首次嘗試製作的海外展覽，企圖系統性地對歐洲公眾推廣美國藝術。展覽雖是美術館的自發產出，但有鑑於其所背負的國家大旗，美、法官員無不積極促成。因為宣傳色彩過重，「美國藝術三百年」的學術含量總為後世所疑，事實證明，藝術價值和政治運作並不互斥。
1955年，紐約現代美術館推出「人類一家」（The Family of Man），以503張來自68個國家的照片，見證不同階級、種族、財富的人，在出生、愛情、工作、死亡等命運歷程前一律平等赤裸，反映全世界人類本質上的同一性。
橫空出世的「人類一家」是攝影史上的里程碑，美國新聞處（United States Information Agency）的評估則認為其四海一家的視角十分正面，恰可作為冷戰時期傳遞民主理念、人道主義所用，於是決定金援美術館向國際推進。展覽在短短幾年走過30幾個國家，累積觀眾逾900萬人，成績之佳，其它攝影展都難以望其項背。
➤➤ #精彩全文請見留言處
當哈佛學者喬瑟夫．奈伊（Joseph Nye）在20世紀末提出「軟實力」一詞時，美國的軍備確實已不如二次大戰後那般一枝獨秀，但美國因為是全球第一經濟體，而且還有龐大的軟實力，所以依舊是不折不扣的全球強權。
奈伊的軟實力指的是文化、價值觀、意識形態等可以透過吸引與說服影響他國行為，使其降低敵意、向己靠攏的力量，比起威脅（軍事）、利誘（經貿）的硬實力更不容易察覺，卻也更容易深入滲透。如爵士音樂表演以即興為核心，強調自由、不受結構束縛，剛好可與冷戰時期蘇聯的僵化做對比，所以有一陣子是美國國務部推行文化外交的固定項目。
奈伊原文沒有提到博物館和美術館，不過文物和展覽一直都是軟實力中的頂級裝備，紐約現代美術館的範例正可說明其潤物細無聲的潛力如何能為國家所用，因此之故，政府在鼓勵美術館博物館向外幅射擴散、經營國際網絡之餘，有時也以更高層級或專門單位干預引導。
例如轟動一時的圖坦卡門黃金面具美國巡迴展，原先兩國文博單位談了很久仍無實質進展，但1974年美國尼克森總統與埃及沙達特總統的破冰會談需要亮點，埃及也需要儘快擺脫第四次中東戰爭後窮兵黷武的負面標籤，那還有什麼比超聚光持光的圖坦卡門面具更堪擔此重任呢？很快埃及就在尼克森訪問時，欣然將借展寫進兩國政府雙邊合約。
2001年911事件發生，西方輿論出現對伊斯蘭教的極端評論，惶惶大亂中，法國總統席拉克以歐美社會亟需知道伊斯蘭文明的貢獻為由，邀請伊斯蘭教國家摩洛哥、科威特、阿曼以及亞塞拜然等國共同出資興建羅浮宮伊斯蘭廳，關鍵時刻，沙烏地阿拉伯王子所成立的阿瓦里德基金會（The Alwaleed Bin Talal Foundation）又挹注大筆捐款，歐洲最大也最重要的伊斯蘭教藝術典藏才順利得以常設專場形式呈現。
伊斯蘭廳展區罩頂猶如一千零一夜中的飛天魔毯，是羅浮宮繼貝聿銘設計的金字塔入口後最大的擴建工程，當所有理論在宗教衝突前手足無措時，各國的協力構築代表了對藝術史「邊緣」角色的重新書寫，也彰顯了互動與互鑑的誠心重啟。
相較於上述回應重大國際情勢的單次性矚目案例，有些國家更致力於以常設組織年復一年、不懈怠地推動館展交流。如創立於1972年，由日本外務省資助的日本基金會（Japan Foundation，又稱國際交流基金，現為行政法人），主理日語教育及文化藝術推廣，威尼斯雙年展的日本館就一直由其主辦；受前法國總統密特朗和日本首相鈴木善幸會晤鼓舞，日本基金會還另行在巴黎艾菲爾鐵塔旁自建日本文化會館，是基金會在海外的唯一多功能場館，非常適合自辦展覽。
除了協助日本藝術家和博物館作品輸出，自2012年起，基金會又劃出一筆只供海外博物館美術館申請的「海外展助成事業」年度補助，可用於日本相關展覽的展件運輸、圖錄印刷、人員往返等費用所需。
但在常設組織當中，最具野心、最具討論度的當屬韓國基金會（Korea Foundation，又稱韓國國際交流財團）。韓國基金會也是由外交部出資，為了突顯韓國與中、日文化的差異，在「自建韓國海外永久據點」和「增加海外館舍韓國露出」兩個傳統做法中，基金會不做選擇，果斷出手疊加成「在海外館舍內建立韓國永久據點」。
1998年，韓國基金會和三星基金會攜手資助紐約大都會博物館成立韓國藝術展廳，接下來又斥資近千萬美金連續支持美國十餘間美術館，包括西雅圖美術館、波士頓美術館等，在館內設立單獨的韓國常設展展廳；大英博物館的韓國展廳亦是循此一途徑產生。
因為韓國深知從藝術體系上游直接介入的效力，在外交部的資本門補助之外，2009年起，韓國文化部又撥款予其隸屬的韓國國立中央博物館，委由執行「海外韓國展廳支援計畫」（Overseas Korean Galleries Support Program），符合資格的海外館舍可視需求自行提出聚焦韓國文化藝術的申請，短期補助如出版、教育、修復、展覽、研究、數位化等最長可達三年；長期補助如展廳整修、人員僱用、大展舉辦、文物借展等最長可達五年。
雖然韓國總是以一種節制但熱烈的情感營造現場，不過實際上，韓國國立中央博物館每年該項計畫的預算只有兩百多萬美金，韓國模式得以成功絕非單憑政府一己之力，而是繫於公私合作無間，相互聲援。
一旦找到值得投資的夥伴，韓國特別擅長中央領航、民間跟進的能量聚攏，以紐約大都會博物館為例，從官方外交部、文化部的補助，非營利機構三星基金會的捐助，到跨國企業愛茉莉太平洋（Amorepacific）和現代汽車的贊助，從硬體、陳列到專款創立韓國藝術策展人職位，資源排列緊密，分配有序，因此才能綻放出猶如重瓣花一樣層次分明、飽滿華麗的韓國形象。
政治學者安荷特（Simon Anholt）主張國家品牌由商品出口、觀光旅遊、文化遺產、人民友善、政府治理及投資與移民等六面向組成，善用文化遺產等軟實力能夠提升一國的國際評價與競爭力。博物館和美術館的國際交流展覽初心雖旨在超越地理疆界展開對話，不過國家品牌中的各面向彼此互相牽動，文化可以創造產值、帶動觀光。
創作需要被看見，而文物每一次的跨國之旅，不僅在承接過往，也是在新的脈絡及新的注視中，開啟知識生產、關係建構、藝術語彙多元化的下一步可能，政策論述的加入當然會影響感知和解讀，但文物本來就是多重意義的承載體，所謂純粹無非只是一種浪漫的情懷。
類似前面文章中，有提到的沙龍裡的繪畫跟作品，作品不一定是主角，但作品是作為參與者、是跟觀眾共同存在的角色，這些關係都是能被感受的。（文／ 黃心蓉）
Amazon.com
https://www.amazon.com › Life-American-Century-Jos...
"A Life in the American Century" This book is a tour de force by a remarkable man chronicling the leadership role Joe Nye has had in shaping our policies worldwide as dean of the Kennedy School ...
《美國世紀的一生》這本書是一位傑出人物的力作，記錄了喬·奈作為肯尼迪學院院長，在塑造我們全球政策方面所發揮的領導作用…
Joseph Nye, "A Life in the American Century"
Harvard University
https://us-japan.wcfia.harvard.edu › nye-2-5-2024
Joseph Nye, "A Life in the American Century"
https://www.amazon.com › Life-American-Century-Jos...
"A Life in the American Century" This book is a tour de force by a remarkable man chronicling the leadership role Joe Nye has had in shaping our policies worldwide as dean of the Kennedy School ...
《美國世紀的一生》這本書是一位傑出人物的力作，記錄了喬·奈作為肯尼迪學院院長，在塑造我們全球政策方面所發揮的領導作用…
Joseph Nye, "A Life in the American Century"
Harvard University
https://us-japan.wcfia.harvard.edu › nye-2-5-2024
Joseph Nye, "A Life in the American Century"
Date: Monday, February 5, 2024, 12:00pm to 1:00pm Location: Bowie-Vernon Conference Room (K262), CGIS Knafel Bldg.
JOSEPH S. NYE JR.
不過，普京(Vladimir Putin)急匆匆地簽署一項已經醞釀了10多年的合同反而確証了俄羅斯在政治上的弱點。盡管受到本世紀頭10年能源價格高漲的提振，俄羅斯的國勢卻每況癒下。從人口統計的角度來看俄羅斯在走下坡路；俄羅斯存在嚴重的健康問題（該國男性平均壽命不過60出頭）；俄羅斯走的是“單一作物經濟”路線，嚴重依賴能源出口。俄羅斯需要推行改革來打造一個多元化、鼓勵創新的經濟體，但俄羅斯在烏克蘭的行動引發了制裁，這使得該國與西方的觀念和技術更加隔閡。成為中國的加氣站並不能逆轉這一趨勢。
真正的地緣政治轉變在於在上一個10年當中開始爆發的頁巖氣革命。盡管水平鑽井和水力壓裂的技術已經不算新鮮，但這兩種技術在頁巖氣開採方面的開創性應用主要是上一個10年當中美國人的創新精神產物。
10年前，很多專家都在談論“石油峰值”(peak oil)，這種理論聲稱，就連沙特的石油儲量也已經見頂。那時人們認為，美國將越來越依賴於能源進口，而且正在建造終端設施，進口高價液化天然氣。但實際上，如今北美洲正在建設用於出口低成本液化天然氣的終端設施，而且能源專家已經形成廣泛共識，北美大陸預計將在21世紀20年代實現能源自足。美國能源部估計，美國可開採的頁巖氣儲量達25萬億立方米，這些天然氣加上其他油氣資源足夠美國用上200年。
對於美國的外交政策而言，頁巖氣革命帶來了一系列影響。頁巖氣的開發提振了經濟，並增加了就業。進口減少也有助於實現收支平衡。新增稅收收入緩解了政府預算壓力。自身能源價格的下降也令美國能源業在全球市場中更具競爭力，在石化、鋁、鋼鐵等對能源價格較為敏感的行業尤其如此。
頁巖氣革命也給美國國內政治帶來了影響，其中之一是心理上的。在一段時間中，美國國內外的許多人士都認為美國正在衰落，對於能源進口的依賴度增加則被常常認為是証據之一。不過，頁巖氣革命改變了美國對於能源的依賴，並且顯現出創業精神、財產權利以及資本市場才是美國真正的力量所在。
懷疑論者認為，對能源進口依賴的降低將令美國從中東脫離。但是這種觀點是對能源經濟的誤解。戰爭或恐怖襲擊等重大幹擾事件可以令途經霍爾木茲海峽的油氣運輸中斷，並將美國和歐洲、日本等其盟友的油氣價格推升到非常高的水平。除此以外，美國在中東除了石油還存在許多其他利害關系，包括防止核武器擴散、保護以色列、保護人權以及反恐等。
對於駐紮於此的美國第五艦隊來說，許多相關基地均由所在國國家政府出資，而維持駐紮在當地的海軍資源的邊際成本並沒有令預算大幅增加。美國可能對於自己在中東的觸角延伸過廣較為謹慎，但這更多是代價高昂的入侵伊拉克，以及阿拉伯革命造成的大范圍動盪的產物，而不是頁巖氣帶來的政治上的“能源獨立”所造成的。美國之所以可以利用石油制裁來令伊朗回到核問題談判桌前，這不僅在於沙特阿拉伯願意彌補伊朗制裁帶來的每日百萬桶的石油產量減少，同時也得益於頁巖氣革命引發的普遍預期。
頁巖氣革命還給美國外交政策帶來了其他好處。委內瑞拉等國家通過提供石油在聯合國以及加勒比地區小型國家結成的組織中拉攏投票，但是頁巖氣革命使得這些國家通過這種方法拉攏投票的能力被削弱。此外，如果美國政府批準增加液化天然氣的出口，那麼最終可以削弱俄羅斯通過威脅切斷天然氣供應而對其鄰國施加壓力的能力。簡而言之，能源市場的地緣政治構造已經發生了改變，但這一改變並非源於俄羅斯與中國的天然氣合約。
（Nye是一名教授，之前曾擔任哈佛肯尼迪政府學院的院長。Nye還是2011年出版的《The Future of Power》的作者。）
When Russia and China announced a $400 billion deal last month for Russia to supply China with 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually for three decades, some analysts heralded it as a tectonic geopolitical shift.
Instead, Vladimir's Putin's haste to sign a deal that had been in the making for more than a decade confirmed his country's political weakness. Despite being buoyed by high energy prices in the first decade of this century, Russia is in decline. Demographically it is shrinking; it has severe health problems (the average Russian male dies in his early 60s); and it is a 'one-crop economy' heavily dependent on energy exports. Russia needs reforms to build a diversified, entrepreneurial economy, but its actions in Ukraine have brought on sanctions that weaken its access to Western ideas and technology. Becoming China's gas station does nothing to reverse this trend.
The real geopolitical shift is the shale-energy revolution that took off in the past decade. While the technologies of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing are not new, their pioneering application to shale rock is largely a product of American entrepreneurship in the past decade.
Ten years ago, many experts were speaking of 'peak oil'-the idea that even reserves in Saudi Arabia had topped off. The U.S. was regarded as increasingly dependent on energy imports and was building terminals to import high-priced liquefied natural gas. Instead, North America is now building terminals to export its low-cost LNG, and the continent is expected to be self-sufficient in energy in the 2020s, according to a broad consensus of energy experts. The Energy Department estimates that the country has 25 trillion cubic meters of technically recoverable resources of shale gas, which when combined with other oil-and-gas resources could last for two centuries.
The shale revolution has a number of implications for American foreign policy. Shale-energy production boosts the economy and produces more jobs. Reducing imports helps the balance of payments. New tax revenues ease government budgets. Cheaper energy makes industry more competitive internationally, particularly energy-intensive industries like petrochemicals, aluminum, steel and others.
There are also domestic political effects. One is psychological. For some time, many people at home and abroad have bought into the myth of American decline. Increasing dependence on energy imports was often cited as evidence. The shale revolution changes that dependence and demonstrates the combination of entrepreneurship, property rights and capital markets that are this country's underlying strength.
Skeptics have argued that lowered dependence on energy imports will cause the U.S. to disengage from the Middle East. This misreads the economics of energy. A major disruption such as a war or terrorist attack that stopped the flow of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz would drive prices to very high levels in America and among our allies in Europe and Japan. Moreover, the U.S. has many interests other than oil in the region, including nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, protection of Israel, human rights and counterterrorism.
As for the costs of maintaining our Fifth Fleet in the region, many bases are paid for by host countries, and the marginal costs of keeping naval resources there instead of elsewhere do not add greatly to the budget. The U.S. may be cautious about overextension in the Middle East, but that is more the product of experience with the costly invasion of Iraq and the general turmoil of the Arab revolutions rather than illusions that shale produces political 'energy independence.' The ability of the U.S. to use oil sanctions to bring Iran to the bargaining table on nuclear issues depended not only on Saudi willingness to make up the million barrels of oil per day that Iran lost, but also on the general expectations that were created by the shale revolution.
Other benefits of the shale revolution for American foreign policy include the diminishing ability of countries like Venezuela to purchase votes in the U.N. and regional organizations of small Caribbean states by shipments of oil, and, if the government will approve more exports of liquefied natural gas, the eventual reduction of Russia's ability to coerce its neighbors by threats to cut off gas supplies. In short, there has been a tectonic shift in the geopolitics of energy, but it was not the Russia-China gas pipeline deal.
Mr. Nye, a professor and former dean at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is the author of 'The Future of Power' (PublicAffairs, 2011).
Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr. (born January 19, 1937) is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He currently holds the position of University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University[1] where he has been a member of the faculty since 1964. He is also the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory neoliberalism, developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. Together with Keohane, he developed the concepts of asymmetrical and complex interdependence.
They also explored transnational relations and world politics in an
edited volume in the 1970s. More recently, he pioneered the theory of soft power. His notion of "smart power" became popular with the use of this phrase by members of the Clinton Administration, and more recently the Obama Administration.[2]
He is a fellows of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and The
British Academy. Nye is also a member of the American Academy of
Diplomacy.[3]
The 2011 TRIP survey of over 1700 international relations scholars ranks Joe Nye as the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past twenty years.[4]
In 2011, he was named by Foreign Policy magazine to its list of top global thinkers.[5] Magazine's valued reporter Daniel Drezner wrote: "All roads to understanding American foreign policy run through Joe Nye."[6]
Nye has published many works in recent years, the most recent being Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era which examines the relationship between presidencies and the rise of American power.[10] His earlier works include: The Future of Power (2011, ISBN 978-1-58648-891-8), Understanding International Conflicts, 7th ed (2009), The Powers to Lead (2008), The Power Game: A Washington Novel (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), and The Paradox of American Power (2002). Nye coined the term soft power in the late 1980s and it first came into widespread usage following a piece he wrote in Foreign Policy in 1990. He is the chairman of the North American branch of the Trilateral Commission.[11] Nye has also consistently written for Project Syndicate since 2002[12]
Joseph Nye: Shale Gas Is America's Geopolitical Trump Card
頁巖氣成為美國手中的地緣政治王牌
JOSEPH S. NYE JR.
當
俄羅斯和中國上個月宣布達成一項總價4,000億美元、由俄羅斯在30年內每年向中國提供380億立方米天然氣的合同時，一些分析人士預計，地緣政治版圖將發生變化。不過，普京(Vladimir Putin)急匆匆地簽署一項已經醞釀了10多年的合同反而確証了俄羅斯在政治上的弱點。盡管受到本世紀頭10年能源價格高漲的提振，俄羅斯的國勢卻每況癒下。從人口統計的角度來看俄羅斯在走下坡路；俄羅斯存在嚴重的健康問題（該國男性平均壽命不過60出頭）；俄羅斯走的是“單一作物經濟”路線，嚴重依賴能源出口。俄羅斯需要推行改革來打造一個多元化、鼓勵創新的經濟體，但俄羅斯在烏克蘭的行動引發了制裁，這使得該國與西方的觀念和技術更加隔閡。成為中國的加氣站並不能逆轉這一趨勢。
Reuters
10年前，很多專家都在談論“石油峰值”(peak oil)，這種理論聲稱，就連沙特的石油儲量也已經見頂。那時人們認為，美國將越來越依賴於能源進口，而且正在建造終端設施，進口高價液化天然氣。但實際上，如今北美洲正在建設用於出口低成本液化天然氣的終端設施，而且能源專家已經形成廣泛共識，北美大陸預計將在21世紀20年代實現能源自足。美國能源部估計，美國可開採的頁巖氣儲量達25萬億立方米，這些天然氣加上其他油氣資源足夠美國用上200年。
對於美國的外交政策而言，頁巖氣革命帶來了一系列影響。頁巖氣的開發提振了經濟，並增加了就業。進口減少也有助於實現收支平衡。新增稅收收入緩解了政府預算壓力。自身能源價格的下降也令美國能源業在全球市場中更具競爭力，在石化、鋁、鋼鐵等對能源價格較為敏感的行業尤其如此。
頁巖氣革命也給美國國內政治帶來了影響，其中之一是心理上的。在一段時間中，美國國內外的許多人士都認為美國正在衰落，對於能源進口的依賴度增加則被常常認為是証據之一。不過，頁巖氣革命改變了美國對於能源的依賴，並且顯現出創業精神、財產權利以及資本市場才是美國真正的力量所在。
懷疑論者認為，對能源進口依賴的降低將令美國從中東脫離。但是這種觀點是對能源經濟的誤解。戰爭或恐怖襲擊等重大幹擾事件可以令途經霍爾木茲海峽的油氣運輸中斷，並將美國和歐洲、日本等其盟友的油氣價格推升到非常高的水平。除此以外，美國在中東除了石油還存在許多其他利害關系，包括防止核武器擴散、保護以色列、保護人權以及反恐等。
對於駐紮於此的美國第五艦隊來說，許多相關基地均由所在國國家政府出資，而維持駐紮在當地的海軍資源的邊際成本並沒有令預算大幅增加。美國可能對於自己在中東的觸角延伸過廣較為謹慎，但這更多是代價高昂的入侵伊拉克，以及阿拉伯革命造成的大范圍動盪的產物，而不是頁巖氣帶來的政治上的“能源獨立”所造成的。美國之所以可以利用石油制裁來令伊朗回到核問題談判桌前，這不僅在於沙特阿拉伯願意彌補伊朗制裁帶來的每日百萬桶的石油產量減少，同時也得益於頁巖氣革命引發的普遍預期。
頁巖氣革命還給美國外交政策帶來了其他好處。委內瑞拉等國家通過提供石油在聯合國以及加勒比地區小型國家結成的組織中拉攏投票，但是頁巖氣革命使得這些國家通過這種方法拉攏投票的能力被削弱。此外，如果美國政府批準增加液化天然氣的出口，那麼最終可以削弱俄羅斯通過威脅切斷天然氣供應而對其鄰國施加壓力的能力。簡而言之，能源市場的地緣政治構造已經發生了改變，但這一改變並非源於俄羅斯與中國的天然氣合約。
（Nye是一名教授，之前曾擔任哈佛肯尼迪政府學院的院長。Nye還是2011年出版的《The Future of Power》的作者。）
Shale Gas Is America's Geopolitical Trump Card
Russia's $400 billion natural-gas deal with China pales beside the significance of U.S. drilling innovations.
June 8, 2014 6:26 p.m. ET
When Russia and China announced a $400 billion deal last month for Russia to supply China with 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually for three decades, some analysts heralded it as a tectonic geopolitical shift.
Instead, Vladimir's Putin's haste to sign a deal that had been in the making for more than a decade confirmed his country's political weakness. Despite being buoyed by high energy prices in the first decade of this century, Russia is in decline. Demographically it is shrinking; it has severe health problems (the average Russian male dies in his early 60s); and it is a 'one-crop economy' heavily dependent on energy exports. Russia needs reforms to build a diversified, entrepreneurial economy, but its actions in Ukraine have brought on sanctions that weaken its access to Western ideas and technology. Becoming China's gas station does nothing to reverse this trend.
The real geopolitical shift is the shale-energy revolution that took off in the past decade. While the technologies of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing are not new, their pioneering application to shale rock is largely a product of American entrepreneurship in the past decade.
Ten years ago, many experts were speaking of 'peak oil'-the idea that even reserves in Saudi Arabia had topped off. The U.S. was regarded as increasingly dependent on energy imports and was building terminals to import high-priced liquefied natural gas. Instead, North America is now building terminals to export its low-cost LNG, and the continent is expected to be self-sufficient in energy in the 2020s, according to a broad consensus of energy experts. The Energy Department estimates that the country has 25 trillion cubic meters of technically recoverable resources of shale gas, which when combined with other oil-and-gas resources could last for two centuries.
The shale revolution has a number of implications for American foreign policy. Shale-energy production boosts the economy and produces more jobs. Reducing imports helps the balance of payments. New tax revenues ease government budgets. Cheaper energy makes industry more competitive internationally, particularly energy-intensive industries like petrochemicals, aluminum, steel and others.
There are also domestic political effects. One is psychological. For some time, many people at home and abroad have bought into the myth of American decline. Increasing dependence on energy imports was often cited as evidence. The shale revolution changes that dependence and demonstrates the combination of entrepreneurship, property rights and capital markets that are this country's underlying strength.
Skeptics have argued that lowered dependence on energy imports will cause the U.S. to disengage from the Middle East. This misreads the economics of energy. A major disruption such as a war or terrorist attack that stopped the flow of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz would drive prices to very high levels in America and among our allies in Europe and Japan. Moreover, the U.S. has many interests other than oil in the region, including nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, protection of Israel, human rights and counterterrorism.
As for the costs of maintaining our Fifth Fleet in the region, many bases are paid for by host countries, and the marginal costs of keeping naval resources there instead of elsewhere do not add greatly to the budget. The U.S. may be cautious about overextension in the Middle East, but that is more the product of experience with the costly invasion of Iraq and the general turmoil of the Arab revolutions rather than illusions that shale produces political 'energy independence.' The ability of the U.S. to use oil sanctions to bring Iran to the bargaining table on nuclear issues depended not only on Saudi willingness to make up the million barrels of oil per day that Iran lost, but also on the general expectations that were created by the shale revolution.
Other benefits of the shale revolution for American foreign policy include the diminishing ability of countries like Venezuela to purchase votes in the U.N. and regional organizations of small Caribbean states by shipments of oil, and, if the government will approve more exports of liquefied natural gas, the eventual reduction of Russia's ability to coerce its neighbors by threats to cut off gas supplies. In short, there has been a tectonic shift in the geopolitics of energy, but it was not the Russia-China gas pipeline deal.
Mr. Nye, a professor and former dean at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is the author of 'The Future of Power' (PublicAffairs, 2011).
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Joseph S. Nye, Jr. | |
|---|---|
 |
|
| Born | January 19, 1937 South Orange, New Jersey |
| Residence | Lexington, Massachusetts |
| Nationality | American |
| Fields | International relations Political science |
| Institutions | Harvard University |
| Alma mater | Princeton University (A.B.) Oxford University (B.A.) Harvard University (Ph.D.) |
| Known for | Soft power |
| Influences | Stanley Hoffmann |
The 2011 TRIP survey of over 1700 international relations scholars ranks Joe Nye as the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past twenty years.[4]
In 2011, he was named by Foreign Policy magazine to its list of top global thinkers.[5] Magazine's valued reporter Daniel Drezner wrote: "All roads to understanding American foreign policy run through Joe Nye."[6]
Contents
Nye has published many works in recent years, the most recent being Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era which examines the relationship between presidencies and the rise of American power.[10] His earlier works include: The Future of Power (2011, ISBN 978-1-58648-891-8), Understanding International Conflicts, 7th ed (2009), The Powers to Lead (2008), The Power Game: A Washington Novel (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), and The Paradox of American Power (2002). Nye coined the term soft power in the late 1980s and it first came into widespread usage following a piece he wrote in Foreign Policy in 1990. He is the chairman of the North American branch of the Trilateral Commission.[11] Nye has also consistently written for Project Syndicate since 2002[12]
Joseph S. Nye
Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
Harvard Kennedy School
Harvard Kennedy School
- Office Address
- Taubman-162
- Mailing Address
- John F. Kennedy School of Government
Mailbox 124
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
- Contact
- Phone: 617-495-1123
Fax: 617-496-3337
Email: joseph_nye@Harvard.Edu
- Assistant
- Jeanne Marasca (617-495-4537)
Profile
Joseph S. Nye Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean of the Kennedy School. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University, did postgraduate work at Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship, and earned a PhD in political science from Harvard. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.In 2004, he published Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics; Understanding International Conflict (5th edition); and The Power Game: A Washington Novel. In 2008 he published The Powers to Lead and his latest book published in 2011 is The Future of Power.Courses
Fall Mod1
- IGA-610M Leadership and Ethics in American Foreign Policy
Spr Mod3
- IGA-130M International Regimes
Media Expertise
Joseph Nye welcomes media inquiries on the following subjects:- Asia
- Defense
- Diplomacy
- Europe
- Foreign Policy
- History
- Intelligence
- International Politics
- Leadership
- Nuclear Weapons
- Terrorism
- United Nations
Research
For a complete list of faculty citations from 2001 - present, please visit the Harvard Kennedy School Research Report Online.Selected Publication Citations:
- Academic Journal/Scholarly Articles
- Nye, Jr., Joseph S. "The Information Revolution and Power." Current History 113.759 (January 2014): 19-22.
- Books
- Nye, Jr., Joseph S. Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era. Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Magazine and Newspaper Articles
- Nye, Jr., Joseph S. "Do Presidents Really Steer Foreign Policy?" Atlantic Monthly. June 2013.
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