【大師大作】：阿马蒂亚·森《身份与暴力——命运的幻象》Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny by Amartya Sen (2006)
Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny
Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers
[Full Text]
Amartya Sen (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006) 224 pp., $24.95 cloth, $15.95 paper,
Kwame Anthony Appiah (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 256 pp., $23.95 cloth, $15.95 paper
June 1, 2007
 |
| Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny |
Michael Blake (reviewer)
These two books are the inaugural releases in Norton's Issues of Our Time series, but they are linked by much more than this fact. Each is a measured attack on the cultural separatism prevalent in many academic and policy circles. According to the cultural separatism thesis, cultures or nations are morally central groups in the world; membership in such groups is both ethically significant and explanatorily powerful; and the borders of cultural and national groups must be preserved against outside influence. This thesis is rejected by both Appiah and Sen, in subtly different ways. Each book, moreover, is extraordinarily personal. Appiah and Sen illustrate their theoretical points with reference to their own experiences and the experiences of their families. The books represent excellence in philosophical reasoning, but only philosophers whose relationship to these issues is more than simply academic could have produced these works.
Sen's argument focuses primarily on the ascription of identity. Individual membership in identity-creating groups such as culture—and, in many recent discussions, religion—is often taken by observers to have an explanatory significance. We tend to think we can know a great deal about a person's beliefs in politics and morality, for example, if we know their cultural background. Cultural activists, moreover, frequently insist that this ascription is normative, rather than simply descriptive; there is, on this account, a single proper way of being Muslim or Arab, and it has implications across all strands of a human life. This assumption is not simply inaccurate, writes Sen, but deadly; it insists upon a single form of identification, making all other forms of diversity sources of disagreement and potential violence. Sen defends, instead, a notion of "diverse diversities" (p. 13), by which we have a plurality of forms of identification, both within and between the large-scale cultural and religious markers we tend to emphasize. Being Muslim, on this account, should not be misinterpreted as a marker defining all aspects of human life. Muslim reactionaries, cultural separatists, and academics such as Samuel Huntington all come under fire for making this mistake of distorting human diversity through a false and damaging simplicity.
Appiah shares this concern for complexity in identification, but combines it with a more extensive account of how our moral duties might change when we encounter difference. The assumption of cultural separation, he argues, underlies both the easy, moral indifference of the cultural relativist and the arrogance of the imperialist. These two approaches to difference—making difference sacred, or imposing sameness through force—rest on both epistemic and moral mistakes. What is needed, Appiah suggests, is a serious attempt to learn how to speak to one another across difference, and much of his book is devoted to explaining both the difficulty and the necessity of this process. This fresh start, moreover, will have to teach us both how to speak and how to disagree across cultures. What emerges by the end of Appiah's book is a conviction that most of this process will happen without the help of philosophical reason. In the end, learning to live with difference is more an arational process of acclimatization—of getting used to one another—than a philosophical process of rational argumentation. We must ultimately seek acceptance and familiarity even with those whose beliefs we reject.
There is much in these books that is fascinating and refreshing, as they reject the separatist thesis frequently found in discussions of multicultural politics and cultural rights. Even more interesting for a student of international relations is the effect of such arguments upon the conventional analyses of international law and sovereignty. Many such analyses rely on a notion of coherent social nations, or ways of life, as the foundational units of international politics; we may think of John Rawls's concept of "peoples" in this context. The arguments of Sen and Appiah make the ascription of cultural separateness, and the normative valuation of cultural groupings, that much more complex. As such, their arguments represent a serious addition to the literature on international ethics. If the easy linkage between state self-determination and cultural survival is rejected, the precise contours of the rights and immunities of state agencies may require considerably more thought.
These books, however, might be better read as introducing a research agenda than a final series of conclusions. Both books function best when understood as attempts to rebut the assumptions of contemporary thinking. Their positive analyses, in contrast, remain somewhat underdeveloped. Sen, for example, does not develop the notion of "diverse diversities" to any significant degree. Identifying this phenomenon is useful, but we need more guidance in understanding just how diverse we want our diversities to be. Some ascriptive forms of identity will surely have some impact upon what other forms of identity might be adopted: identifying myself as a philosophical liberal, for example, will likely preclude me from also identifying with a theocratic religious order. Similarly, if I am both Catholic and homosexual, there will be—at the very least—an internal pressure and tension from holding these two identities. It would have been helpful for Sen to provide a more complex analysis of when and how we are right to take some forms of identity as having priority over other forms. The easy assumption that we can explain everything about ourselves with reference to a single strand of identity is surely wrong, as Sen notes. But the fact that some forms of identity determine or shape other forms of identity must also be acknowledged and understood; we cannot ignore the ways in which some of our identities do, and must, take priority over others. A more complex and accurate account of cultural identity, then, would neither always accept nor always reject the idea that some forms of identity will dominate others. Sen is quite right to reject the simple account on which some forms of identity are inevitably dominant; a more complex account of identity, however, would nonetheless accept that some forms of identity place pressure on other acceptable forms of identification. Sen paves the way for this more complex account, but it remains as yet undeveloped.
Appiah's argument, similarly, might stand more in need of amplification than amendment. His solution to the difficulties of speaking across difference is attractive; we should seek to become used to one another's foibles rather than solve all disagreements through force or argument. The difficulty, however, is that we still need some guidance about what sorts of differences we should seek to accommodate. To know everything is not always—or should not be, at any rate—to forgive much of anything. There are some sorts of difference whose evil we ought to keep sharp and focused in our minds; we would be wrong, for example, to lump political fascism together with religious difference, as an example of the sort of difference we should simply cease to find unusual. Appiah would agree, of course; he is no relativist. The difficulty in this case lies only in finding a principle suitable to determine what sorts of difference we ought to normalize. Appiah may be right that toleration across cultures will not be achieved by philosophy; surely, however, philosophy will have something useful to say about how to determine the sorts of toleration we ought and ought not to seek.
All this suggests only that the books ought to be taken as introducing a new direction in research rather than a settled position. Both books are admirable and valuable additions to our literature on global ethics in an age of cultural diversities.
—Michael Blake, University of Washington
- Amartya Sen (People)
- Kwame Anthony Appiah (People)
身份与暴力——命运的幻象
)
- 出版时间： 2009-10-1
- 字 数： 168000
- 版 次： 1
- 页 数： 206
- 印刷时间： 2009-10-1
内容简介
作者简介
目录
对相互竞争的社会联系的认可
约束与自由
说服他人
对选择与责任的否定
文明的禁闭
超越宗教
穆斯林与知识的多样性
混乱之焰
第二章 理解身份认同
身份无关论与理性的白痴
多重关系与社会环境
对立身份与非对立身份
选择与约束
社区身份与选择的可能性
优先性与理性
第三章 文明的界限
单一视野与貌似深刻
文明解释的两个困难
论把印度视为印度教文明
论所谓西方价值观的独特性
民主的全球根基
西方科学与全球历史
拙劣的概括与模糊的历史
第四章 宗教联系与穆斯林历史
宗教身份和文化多样性
穆斯林宽容和多样性
非宗教性考虑和多样化的优先性
数学、科学和知识的历史
多重身份和当代政治
反对恐怖主义与认识身份
恐怖主义与宗教
穆斯林身份的多样性
第五章 西方与反西方
殖民化思想的辩证法
亚洲价值观与一些更小的主题
殖民主义和非洲
原教旨主义和西方中心性
第六章 文化与束缚
虚构的真理和实际的政策
韩国与加纳
日本的经历和公共政策
宽广视野中的文化
多元文化主义和文化自由
学校、理性和信仰
第七章 全球化与抗议
抗议、准确性和公共理性
批评、抗议和全球团结
知识界的团结
地方性对全球性
经济全球化和不平等
全球贫困和全球公平
更加公平的可能性
忽略与责任
贫穷、暴力和义愤
意识和身份认同
第八章 多元文化主义与自由
英国的成就
多元单一文化主义的问题
理性的优先性
甘地的论点
第九章 思考的自由
暴力的滋生
高级理论的低级运用
单一性幻象的惩罚
全球性抗议的作用
一个可能的世界
注释
人名索引
主题索引
书摘插图
1《身份与暴力——命运的幻想》作品相关
2身份与暴力——命运的幻想
第一章：幻象的暴力（1）
Identity and Violence: The Illusion of DestinyIdentity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny |
 |
| Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny |
Sen's argument focuses primarily on the ascription of identity. Individual membership in identity-creating groups such as culture—and, in many recent discussions, religion—is often taken by observers to have an explanatory significance. We tend to think we can know a great deal about a person's beliefs in politics and morality, for example, if we know their cultural background. Cultural activists, moreover, frequently insist that this ascription is normative, rather than simply descriptive; there is, on this account, a single proper way of being Muslim or Arab, and it has implications across all strands of a human life. This assumption is not simply inaccurate, writes Sen, but deadly; it insists upon a single form of identification, making all other forms of diversity sources of disagreement and potential violence. Sen defends, instead, a notion of "diverse diversities" (p. 13), by which we have a plurality of forms of identification, both within and between the large-scale cultural and religious markers we tend to emphasize. Being Muslim, on this account, should not be misinterpreted as a marker defining all aspects of human life. Muslim reactionaries, cultural separatists, and academics such as Samuel Huntington all come under fire for making this mistake of distorting human diversity through a false and damaging simplicity.
Appiah shares this concern for complexity in identification, but combines it with a more extensive account of how our moral duties might change when we encounter difference. The assumption of cultural separation, he argues, underlies both the easy, moral indifference of the cultural relativist and the arrogance of the imperialist. These two approaches to difference—making difference sacred, or imposing sameness through force—rest on both epistemic and moral mistakes. What is needed, Appiah suggests, is a serious attempt to learn how to speak to one another across difference, and much of his book is devoted to explaining both the difficulty and the necessity of this process. This fresh start, moreover, will have to teach us both how to speak and how to disagree across cultures. What emerges by the end of Appiah's book is a conviction that most of this process will happen without the help of philosophical reason. In the end, learning to live with difference is more an arational process of acclimatization—of getting used to one another—than a philosophical process of rational argumentation. We must ultimately seek acceptance and familiarity even with those whose beliefs we reject.
There is much in these books that is fascinating and refreshing, as they reject the separatist thesis frequently found in discussions of multicultural politics and cultural rights. Even more interesting for a student of international relations is the effect of such arguments upon the conventional analyses of international law and sovereignty. Many such analyses rely on a notion of coherent social nations, or ways of life, as the foundational units of international politics; we may think of John Rawls's concept of "peoples" in this context. The arguments of Sen and Appiah make the ascription of cultural separateness, and the normative valuation of cultural groupings, that much more complex. As such, their arguments represent a serious addition to the literature on international ethics. If the easy linkage between state self-determination and cultural survival is rejected, the precise contours of the rights and immunities of state agencies may require considerably more thought.
These books, however, might be better read as introducing a research agenda than a final series of conclusions. Both books function best when understood as attempts to rebut the assumptions of contemporary thinking. Their positive analyses, in contrast, remain somewhat underdeveloped. Sen, for example, does not develop the notion of "diverse diversities" to any significant degree. Identifying this phenomenon is useful, but we need more guidance in understanding just how diverse we want our diversities to be. Some ascriptive forms of identity will surely have some impact upon what other forms of identity might be adopted: identifying myself as a philosophical liberal, for example, will likely preclude me from also identifying with a theocratic religious order. Similarly, if I am both Catholic and homosexual, there will be—at the very least—an internal pressure and tension from holding these two identities. It would have been helpful for Sen to provide a more complex analysis of when and how we are right to take some forms of identity as having priority over other forms. The easy assumption that we can explain everything about ourselves with reference to a single strand of identity is surely wrong, as Sen notes. But the fact that some forms of identity determine or shape other forms of identity must also be acknowledged and understood; we cannot ignore the ways in which some of our identities do, and must, take priority over others. A more complex and accurate account of cultural identity, then, would neither always accept nor always reject the idea that some forms of identity will dominate others. Sen is quite right to reject the simple account on which some forms of identity are inevitably dominant; a more complex account of identity, however, would nonetheless accept that some forms of identity place pressure on other acceptable forms of identification. Sen paves the way for this more complex account, but it remains as yet undeveloped.
Appiah's argument, similarly, might stand more in need of amplification than amendment. His solution to the difficulties of speaking across difference is attractive; we should seek to become used to one another's foibles rather than solve all disagreements through force or argument. The difficulty, however, is that we still need some guidance about what sorts of differences we should seek to accommodate. To know everything is not always—or should not be, at any rate—to forgive much of anything. There are some sorts of difference whose evil we ought to keep sharp and focused in our minds; we would be wrong, for example, to lump political fascism together with religious difference, as an example of the sort of difference we should simply cease to find unusual. Appiah would agree, of course; he is no relativist. The difficulty in this case lies only in finding a principle suitable to determine what sorts of difference we ought to normalize. Appiah may be right that toleration across cultures will not be achieved by philosophy; surely, however, philosophy will have something useful to say about how to determine the sorts of toleration we ought and ought not to seek.
All this suggests only that the books ought to be taken as introducing a new direction in research rather than a settled position. Both books are admirable and valuable additions to our literature on global ethics in an age of cultural diversities.
—Michael Blake, University of Washington
- Amartya Sen (People)
- Kwame Anthony Appiah (People)
身份与暴力——命运的幻象
- 出版时间： 2009-10-1
- 字 数： 168000
- 版 次： 1
- 页 数： 206
- 印刷时间： 2009-10-1
内容简介
作者简介
目录
对相互竞争的社会联系的认可
约束与自由
说服他人
对选择与责任的否定
文明的禁闭
超越宗教
穆斯林与知识的多样性
混乱之焰
第二章 理解身份认同
身份无关论与理性的白痴
多重关系与社会环境
对立身份与非对立身份
选择与约束
社区身份与选择的可能性
优先性与理性
第三章 文明的界限
单一视野与貌似深刻
文明解释的两个困难
论把印度视为印度教文明
论所谓西方价值观的独特性
民主的全球根基
西方科学与全球历史
拙劣的概括与模糊的历史
第四章 宗教联系与穆斯林历史
宗教身份和文化多样性
穆斯林宽容和多样性
非宗教性考虑和多样化的优先性
数学、科学和知识的历史
多重身份和当代政治
反对恐怖主义与认识身份
恐怖主义与宗教
穆斯林身份的多样性
第五章 西方与反西方
殖民化思想的辩证法
亚洲价值观与一些更小的主题
殖民主义和非洲
原教旨主义和西方中心性
第六章 文化与束缚
虚构的真理和实际的政策
韩国与加纳
日本的经历和公共政策
宽广视野中的文化
多元文化主义和文化自由
学校、理性和信仰
第七章 全球化与抗议
抗议、准确性和公共理性
批评、抗议和全球团结
知识界的团结
地方性对全球性
经济全球化和不平等
全球贫困和全球公平
更加公平的可能性
忽略与责任
贫穷、暴力和义愤
意识和身份认同
第八章 多元文化主义与自由
英国的成就
多元单一文化主义的问题
理性的优先性
甘地的论点
第九章 思考的自由
暴力的滋生
高级理论的低级运用
单一性幻象的惩罚
全球性抗议的作用
一个可能的世界
注释
人名索引
主题索引
Contents[edit]
Nobel Prize
Bicycles are not a common tool in economic science, but Amartya Sen's bicycle played a role in his research.
A large part of his work is concerned with the conditions of the most impoverished members of society and how these can be improved. In a study on differences between baby girls and boys, Sen employed an assistant to weigh the children. Problems arose when the children did not want to weighed and bit the assistant. The episode ended with Amartya Sen bicycling through the countryside of West Bengal, weighing the children himself.
Amartya Sen was awarded the Prize in Economic Sciences in 1998 for his studies of social choice, welfare measurement and poverty research.
Read more about his research: https://bit.ly/2wk7RiJ
#WorldBicycleDay
India and China : interactions through Buddhism and diplomacy ; a collection ...
By Prabodh Chandra Bagchi
https://books.google.com.tw/books?id=MB4CHPi7dycC&pg=PR5&source=gbs_selected_pages
王邦雄教授在【紀念師覺月教授】2010，提到Amartya Sen (阿馬蒂亞 沈)是 Nalanda Mentor Group 的主持人，The Argumentative Indian 翻譯成 【慣於爭鳴的印度人】
現在的中文翻譯，各說各的，【慣於爭鳴的印度人】譯者 : 劉建不知道PRABODH CHANDRA BAGCHI 叫師覺月--著【 INDIA AND CHINA A THOUSAND YEARS OF CULTURAL RELATIONS】，將 Identity 翻譯成"特性"。 Amartya Sen 在The Argumentative Indian 的第8章【中國與印度】力排西方以宗教為主來界定各"文明"，他談的是中國與印度在非宗教的交流，網路上更有他用經濟學/聯合國的"生活品質指標和中印制度的不同，針貶印度的缺失之學術論文。 慣於爭鳴的印度人內容簡介 · · · · · ·作者簡介 · · · · · ·目錄 · · · · · ·中譯本序 序 梵文語詞變音標誌方法 第一編直言與異議 一、慣於爭鳴的印度人 二、不平等、不穩定與不平之鳴 三、印度：大與小 四、移民社群與世界 第二編文化與交流 五、泰戈爾與他的印度 六、我們的文化，他們的文化 七、印度的傳統與西方的想像 八、中國與印度 第三編政治與抗爭 九、與命運之神的幽會 十、印度的階級 十一、女人與男人 十二、印度與原子彈 第四編理性與身份 十三、理性的範疇 十四、世俗主義與不滿因素 十五、透過曆法看印度 十六、印度人的身份 註釋 人名索引 總索引 譯後記 |
| New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, ©2005 |
The Idea of Justice: Amartya Sen: 9780674060470: Amazon.com ...
www.amazon.com › ... › Economics › Theory - CachedShare The most important contribution to the subject since John Rawls' A Theory of Justice.Sen argues that what we urgently need in our troubled world is not a theory ...
The Idea of Justice
Amartya Kumar Sen
161 Reviews
Harvard University Press, Sep 30, 2009 - 496 pages
Social justice: an ideal, forever beyond our grasp; or one of many practical possibilities? More than a matter of intellectual discourse, the idea of justice plays a real role in how - and how well - people live. And in this book the distinguished scholar Amartya Sen offers a powerful critique of the theory of social justice that, in its grip on social and political thinking, has long left practical realities far behind.
Contents
An Approach to Justice 1
The Demands of Justice 29
Reason and Objectivity 31
Rawls and Beyond 52
Institutions and Persons 75
Voice and Social Choice 87
Impartiality and Objectivity 114
Closed and Open Impartiality 124
Lives Freedoms and Capabilities 225
Capabilities and Resources 253
Happiness Wellbeing and Capabilities 269
Equality and Liberty 291
Public Reasoning and Democracy 319
Democracy as Public Reason 321
The Practice of Democracy 338
Human Rights and Global Imperatives 355
Forms of Reasoning 153
Position Relevance and Illusion 155
Rationality and Other People 174
Plurality of Impartial Reasons 194
Realizations Consequences and Agency 208
The Materials of Justice 223
Justice and the World 388
Notes 417
Name Index 451
Subject Index 462
Copyright
書評
經濟學家阿瑪蒂亞·森眼裡的正義
李慧敏為紐約時報中文網撰稿 2012年11月13日
用經濟增長的速度與規模衡量，中國過去三十年所實踐的經濟學無疑是領先世界的。但是，人們幸福感不僅來自不斷增長的GDP。中國的發展模式已經越來越難以迴避貧富差距擴大、社會矛盾激化的問題。胡錦濤在十八大報告中坦承，中國“社會矛盾明顯增多”。對中國新一代領導層而言，如何促進社會公平正義，比如何推動增長更迫在眉睫。
一般而言，經濟學的根本問題是資源配置，其核心的追求是“效率”而非“公平”。然而，與多數經濟學家們不同的是，阿瑪蒂亞·森一生的學術研究興趣都集中在，讓經濟學理論為增進社會公平，特別是消除貧困服務。
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胡錦濤十八大講話總結執政十年
十八大開啟中國領導層換屆進程
生長在印度的阿瑪蒂亞·森日前到訪北京，他10月19日在人民大學的一次題為“正義與世界”(Justice and the World)演講中，讚揚了中國在發展經濟、消除貧困方面的巨大成就，認為有很多值得印度學習的地方。不過，他也點出中國發展的同時也需要應對社會公平正義的缺失——“儘管已經取得了巨大的成就，但中國的政府和人民都敏銳地察覺到，還有很多方面值得努力。”
阿瑪蒂亞·森憑藉其對福利經濟學的貢獻獲得諾貝爾經濟學獎。他曾執教於倫敦政治經濟學院、牛津大學、哈佛大學，現任劍橋大學三一學院院長。他的學說致力於探求集體決策和個人價值之間的關係，福利與貧困的指數衡量，最貧困人群的福利等諸多方面。他的《正義的理念》(The Idea of Justice)日前被譯為中文。書中關於正義的闡述，對於亟待解決財富分配不公的中國，堪稱一塊“他山之石”。
《正義的理念》闡述了是作者基於社會選擇理論、公共理性和全球視野的構建的正義理念。有“經濟學界的良心”之稱的阿瑪蒂亞·森認為，一個社會應當公平地分配基本品，並幫助人們將這些基本品轉化為自己珍視的價值；通過改善教育，醫療設施，提高人們的“可行能力”；關懷弱勢群體，保障人權；用自由的新聞媒體促進公共理性，使人們能就社會存在的非正義達成共識，並通過改進它們，來達到正義。
讓我們設想這樣一個場景：是安妮，鮑勃，還是卡拉，應該得到那支被他們爭搶的長笛？安妮說，她應該得到那支長笛，因為三人之中只有她會吹奏；鮑勃認為，他是三人中最貧窮的，沒有自己的玩具，而長笛恰能成為他玩的東西；卡拉則爭辯道：自己一個人辛苦了好幾個月才製作了這支長笛。
聽完上述三個人的理由，要做出一個“正義的”決定，並不容易。各個經濟學流派都能就誰應該得到長笛給出一套理由，而他們的答案可能完全不同。《正義的理念》指出，沒有一個永恆的正義理念可以幫我們做出決定。
阿瑪蒂亞·森的理論被認為是對“先驗主義”正義原則——亦即自由平等主義的哲學家的批判。自由平等主義的傳統由霍布斯開創，歷經洛克、盧梭、康德，到當代的羅爾斯。這一傳統致力於運用邏輯，道德直覺和各種經驗性知識，建構出一整套正義體系，並發展出一套正義的制度。
阿瑪蒂亞·森認為，社會契約是 “先驗主義”正義原則的核心，這一傳統存在的兩大缺陷：首先，一套通過思辨而得出的正義的社會的理念很難真正用於解決複雜的社會問題；其次，如果處在一個通過社會契約建立的，同時也是“封閉的”主權國家中，缺乏比較的視野，人們無法判斷自己是否已經達到正義的境界。
在阿瑪蒂亞·森眼裡，與尋找一套“先驗的”正義原則，不如採用“比較性框架”來指導對正義的追求。“比較性框架”並不追求發現完美的正義，而是試圖比較人們不同的生活方式，運用公共理性，就明顯的非正義達成共識，並去改造它們。阿瑪蒂亞·森將自己與亞當·斯密、孔多塞歸入“比較性框架”。
假如不追求一整套關於正義的理論和原則，我們應當如何定義非正義呢？
阿瑪蒂亞·森強調公共理性在辨識非正義的過程中的作用。他認為，通過協商式治理，公共辯論，不受限制的批判審思，人們可以在公共領域內發出自己的聲音，並注意到自己周圍非正義的現象。“作為公眾理性的民主”並不僅限於西方，限於投票選舉這一種形式。東方國家，不論是印度、日本，還是中國、南非、緬甸，乃至中東國家，都有過對公共事務進行協商的傳統。
按照他的理論，政治自由和民主制度在當今時代本身就是發展的一部分。阿瑪蒂亞·森特彆強調了自由的新聞媒體對促進公眾理性的作用。新聞媒體能夠促使人們相互溝通，認識彼此生活的世界，能夠傳播知識，允許批判性審思；能使被忽視者和弱勢人群發出自己的聲音；促使開明和不受限制的價值觀的形成。
除了集體決策以外，森對於個體的意願也給予了充分的注意。他不僅強調基本品的分配，還強調人們應當能夠基於他們選擇不同生活道路的意願，將基本品——金錢、權力、社會地位、自由，等等，轉化為他們珍視的價值的能力。比起最終的成就和結果，森更強調人們的自由和機會。因此，社會選擇理論也在森的正義框架中也具有重要位置。這一理論通常在一系列公理的指引下，探討個體排序和優先性，與社會結構之間的功能性聯繫。
對當下的中國來說，貧富差距擴大，環境污染，經濟的可持續發展，公共衛生體系的建設和完善等等問題都是嚴峻的挑戰。中國的所謂“新左派”、“自由派”、“改革派”、“保守派”都對如何追求正義都或多或少給出了一些方案和設計。
不過，在公共討論當中，最重要的並非極端情緒和“唯我正確”的思維方式，人們在發言之前都應當用切實的知識和理性釐清自己所主張的是何種經濟制度、政治制度和法律體系。基於微博和其他媒體的辯論，現實中關於公共議題的沙龍都可算作拓展公共空間的寶貴嘗試。儘管這些嘗試有時缺乏程序約束和自律，有時還會受到經濟利益的誘惑和干擾，但人們依然可以通過增進自己的知識和理性來更好地利用這些平台，實現對社會議題的理性商談。
當然，寬容的對話和協商治理除了民間的努力以外，更離不開高層的選擇。領導人們應當運用他們手中的權力和資源，為公共理性的釋放創造條件，尋求一條通向開放和民主的社會的道路，保護每一個人相應的經濟和政治權利。阿瑪蒂亞·森對公共理性的論述或許是《正義的理念》一書最能吸引中國讀者的章節。
胡錦濤在十八大報告中也將“健全社會主義協商民主制度”作為了政治體制改革的一環。中國知名媒體人胡舒立最近發表評論稱，報告談到“協商民主”，非一般性地指政協組織。協商民主是當代政治學關注的新領域，主張多元社會中的公民直接參与。在十八大，協商民主的提出是一種制度建設主張，亦即“完善協商民主制度和工作機制，推進協商民主廣泛、多層、制度化發展”。這一切如能落實，對中國的進步必是有益的。
人權在阿瑪蒂亞·森的立論框架中也很重要。世界上每一個人，無論其國籍、居住地、種族、階級、種姓、社團，都應該擁有應受到其他人尊重的基本權利——這種頗具吸引力也頗具爭議的道德宣言，成為了作者全球正義的理論依據。
阿瑪蒂亞·森援引法哲學大師赫伯特·哈特的著名論文《真的存在自然權利嗎》的論證，將人權視為法律之母，是人權推動了具體的立法，而非將人權視為具體的法律條款。因為“道德權利可以，也經常成為新立法的基礎”，森解決了人權這一議題的存在依據和運用方式。此外，人權還應當被置於開發性的審思和公共辯論之下——因為即使對人權主張的意見一致，對於人權的內容，不同類型的人權所具有的權重等問題，人們之間依然會存在嚴重的分歧。
此外，全書充滿娓娓道來的優美敘述。狄更斯筆下的主人公皮普，法國大革命前夕在倫敦議會上演說的埃德蒙·伯克，在《經集》中闡述責任與義務的佛祖釋迦牟尼，寫下《漫漫自由路》的納爾遜·曼德拉，他們對生活的真切感受和對美好世界的嚮往都躍然紙上。對於正義的思考者們，對於公共理性尚未成熟的社會，對於面臨全球化挑戰的世界，阿瑪蒂亞·森的《正義的理念》都將提供有益的洞見。
《正義的理念》(The Idea of Justice)，2012年6月由中國人民大學出版社出版。
李慧敏是紐約時報中文網實習生。
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The standard of living: The Tanner lectures : Amartya Sen, Cambridge, 1985, edited by Geoffrey Hawthorn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. xiv + 125, $25.00
中國上海財經有翻譯本 不很清楚The Standard of Living
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The Standard of Living. AMARTYA SEN. THE TANNER LECTURES O N HUMAN VALUES. Delivered at. Clare Hall, Cambridge University. March 11 and 12, ...
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