Q. and A.: Geremie R. Barmé on Understanding Xi Jinping
JANE PERLEZ November 9, 2015
時報看中國
白傑明：要讀懂「習大大」，得先理解「毛爺爺」
JANE PERLEZ 2015年11月9日
Geremie R. Barmé is a professor of Chinese history and founding director of the Australian Center on China in the World at the Australian National University. He has just released “China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny,” a lively collection of essays on China under President Xi Jinping, edited with Linda Jaivin and Jeremy Goldkorn. Mr. Barmé chose the essays on the basis of readability, as well as depth of knowledge.Mr. Barmé began his career in 1972 studying Chinese at the Australian National University. In 1974, at the age of 20, he went to China to continue his studies, moving from Beijing to Shenyang and Shanghai. As the Cultural Revolution wound down, he did a stint picking apples in northeastern China and observed the collapse of Maoism. From 1978 to 1991, he wrote for Chinese-language newspapers in Hong Kong. He has been based at Australian National University since 1989, with diversions into making films, writing books and even offering suggestions for speeches on China by Australian prime ministers.
白傑明(Geremie R. Barmé)是中國史教授，也是澳大利亞國立大學中華全球研究中心(Australian Center on China in the World)的創始人暨主任。他剛剛推出的《中國故事年鑒2014：共同命運》(China Story Yearbook2014: Shared Destiny)是一本生動的文集，講述習近平領導下的中國，由賈佩琳(Linda Jaivin)和金玉米(Jeremy Goldkorn)編輯。白傑明以可讀性和知識的深度為標準，選擇了這些文章。1972年，白傑明在澳大利亞國立大學學習中文，從此開始了他的事業。1974年，20歲的白傑明前往中國留學，先後在北京、瀋陽和上海居住過。文革末期，他在中國東北做了一段時間採摘蘋果的工作，觀察了毛澤東主義的崩潰。從1978年到1991年，他為香港的中文報章撰稿。1989年後，他一直以澳大利亞國立大學的工作為主，有時候也拍電影、寫書，甚至曾為澳大利亞總理涉及中國的發言提供建議。
In an interview, he explained why, to understand Mr. Xi’s tenure, “you have to have a basic understanding of Mao.”
他在訪談中解釋了，為什麼說要理解習近平執政期間的做法，「就必須對毛澤東有基本的理解」。
Q. As a longtime China watcher, what is special for your craft in the Xi era?
問：你長期觀察中國的狀況，你覺得觀察習近平時代有什麼不同之處呢？
Ng Han Guan/Associated Press
9月3日，北京舉行閱兵，慶祝在二戰中打敗日本70周年。圖為坦克開過大屏幕，屏幕上顯示的是中國國家主席習近平。
A. As an historian who went to universities in Australia, China and Japan and as a Sinologist who learned Chinese from and did a doctorate with Pierre Ryckmans, the Xi era is something of a gift. The dark art of Chinese rule combines elements of dynastic statecraft, official Confucianism, the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist legacy and the mixed socialist-neoliberal reforms of the post-Mao era.
答：對於一個曾在澳大利亞、中國和日本的大學求學的歷史學者，以及一個從李克曼(Pierre Ryckmans)那裡了解中國，跟他讀博士學位的漢學家來說，習近平時代就像是天賜良機。中國人統治國家的「黑魔法」包含王朝式的治國方略、官方推行的儒家思想、馬列主義毛澤東思想的影響，以及後毛澤東時代社會主義和新自由主義混合的改革舉措。
Under Xi Jinping, the man I like to call China’s C.O.E., or Chairman of Everything, these traditions are being drawn on to build a China for the 21st century. For those used to thinking about China as being a country that “just wants to be like us,” or as one that fits neatly into the patterns of the Euro-American past, the Xi era is a challenge. For the many students of China who haven’t bothered reading Mao, taking the Marxist tradition seriously or familiarizing themselves with the country’s dynastic legacies, Xi’s version of China is positively discombobulating.
我喜歡把習近平稱為中國的「COE」——全抓全管的老總(Chairman of Everything)。習近平執政期間，為構築一個面向21世紀的中國，運用了以上的傳統。有些人曾以為中國「就想成為像我們這樣的國家」，或是以為它能與歐美過去的模式相契合，對於他們來說，理解習近平時代就是一個挑戰。一些研究中國的學者疏於閱讀毛澤東著作，不重視馬克思主義傳統，對中國古代王朝的遺產也不熟悉，對於他們當中的許多人來說，習近平治下的中國確實非常令人困惑。
Q. Some people in China refer to Mr. Xi as “Emperor Xi.” Are there similarities?
問：中國有些人稱習近平為「習帝」，兩者間否有相似之處？
A. Since the Mao era, it has been a commonplace for even rather levelheaded analysts and observers to speak of Chinese leaders as emperors or want-to-be emperors. This generates a comfortable metaphorical landscape, one that Chinese friends also often encourage. It puts Chinese political culture and behavior beyond the realm of the normal or knowable. It reaffirms Chinese claims about a unique history and political longevity. Mao was an expert at playing off and against the imperial tradition while sitting above factions that he manipulated in pursuit of his radical political and personal goals.
答：自毛澤東時代以來，這種事情已經司空見慣，即使頭腦相當清醒的分析師和觀察家，也常把中國領導人稱為皇帝，或者說想當皇帝。這會產生一種舒適的隱喻氛圍，中國朋友也經常鼓勵這麼做。它讓中國的政治文化和政治行為，超出了正常或可知的境界，重申了中國人所說的獨特歷史和久遠的政治傳統。毛澤東是一個玩弄帝王傳統的專家，他凌駕於被他操縱的派系之上，追求自身激進的政治和個人目標。
Of course, Xi aspires to something like that, if not more. But he is a long way from having Mao’s charisma or being able to play the system or the people with similar alacrity, though not for want of trying. The official adulation of Xi and the fact that he is omnipresent are reminiscent of the leader complex of other, older socialist states. Emperors were far more constrained and media shy.
當然，習近平渴望達到甚至超過這種程度。但他欠缺毛澤東的領袖魅力，也不能像毛澤東那樣靈巧地把體制和人民玩弄於鼓掌之中，這倒不是因為缺乏嘗試。官方對他吹捧逢迎，到處都有他的身影，這讓人想到了其他更老的社會主義國家的領袖情結。皇帝們遠遠更為克制，也更加遠離傳媒。
Q. How is the current crackdown on expression affecting creativity on the Internet?
問：當前言論自由遭受的打擊對網絡創造力有何影響？
A. There is no doubt that the threnody of the era of “Big Daddy Xi,” as the official media call the C.O.E., is boredom. The lugubrious propaganda chief, Liu Yunshan, the Internet killjoyLu Wei and Xi himself have together cast a pall over Chinese cultural and intellectual life. At the same time, the party-state is at pains to extol homegrown innovation and creativity. Does not a semi-Maoist state revel in the unity of contradictions?
Perhaps one of the challenges China poses to our understanding of narratives of development, progress and modernity is that innovative change may well also be possible, if not flourish, under postmodern authoritarianism. Or does one just pickpocket innovation from elsewhere and use state-controlled hyperbole to lay claim to creativity?
中國對我們理解發展、進步和現代性的敘事所構成的一個挑戰大概是，在後現代威權主義制度下，創新變革即便無法繁榮，或許也是可能的。還是說有人只會從其他地方盜取創意，再用官方控制的誇張言論聲稱是自己的原創？
Q. Do you see nationalism getting out of hand?
問：您覺得民族主義失控了嗎？
A. In a way, nationalism in China has been out of hand for years: the intense and costly nationwide re-education campaign launched in the wake of June 4, 1989, emphasized China’s unique national situation, its undivided “nationhood” and grand history. The popular sense of exceptionalism is here to stay.
答：在某種程度上，中國的民族主義已經失控很多年了。1989年6月4日以後，中國在全國範圍內深入開展了代價不菲的再教育活動，強調中國特殊的國情、強烈的「國家意識」和偉大的歷史。中國的獨特性由此在民眾中紮下了根。
But this exceptionalism is threatened by Taiwan, which has taken such a different sociopolitical path. It is threatened by Hong Kong, where the complex legacies of colonialism feed into local identity and political conscience. It is threatened by the very pluralism that market reforms engender in China itself.
但這種獨特性受到了台灣和香港的威脅。台灣採取了大為不同的社會政治道路，而在香港，殖民主義遺留下的複雜影響，融入了當地的身份認同和政治意識。市場改革在中國內部帶來的多元化，也對其構成為了威脅。
Of course, China is achieving long-cherished goals of strength and power, but in the process it has forged a one-party nation-state that, apart from tireless police action, maintains unity through aggravated propaganda and public bellicosity. But there is also the “Other China” — one that is educated, informed, skeptical, well-read, often well-traveled and part of a modern global society. This Other China is often silenced, ignored or ill-understood, but it will flourish well beyond the tenure of Xi Jinping.
當然，中國追求強盛的夙願正在達成，但在這個過程中，它形成了一個一黨制的民族國家。除了不懈的警方行動外，這個國家還通過大肆宣傳和在公開場合好勇鬥狠來維持統一。但還有「另外一個中國」，他們受過良好的教育、見多識廣、對事物有所懷疑、博覽群書，通常都有豐富的旅行經歷，且是現代全球社會的一部分。這「另外一個中國」常常會被禁言、忽視或誤解，但即便是在習近平任期結束之後，它也還是能蓬勃生長。
Q. Where will the relationship between China and the United States stand five years from now?
問：五年後的中美關係會是什麼樣子？
For an Australian this is a discomforting question, in particular since my country has participated in just about every U.S. venture since World War II. Most of these gambits have been bloody, costly and enjoyed suboptimal results. Therefore, living in a country that is bound in a cap-doffing alliance with our American cousins I can only hope that if the U.S. and its regional partners proceed with a policy of “China deterrence” they will prove successful.
答：對一個澳大利亞人來說，這是一個讓人感到不舒服的問題，特別是因為我的國家幾乎參與了美國在二戰後的每一場冒險行動。這些行動大部分都很血腥，代價高昂，結果卻並不理想。因此，生活在一個與美國有盟友關係，且敬重美國的國家，我只能希望，如果美國和地區內的夥伴繼續實行「威懾中國」的政策，最好能取得成功。
Failing that, one would hope that China and the U.S. reach an accommodation along the lines suggested rather idealistically by my colleague Hugh White [professor of strategic studies at Australian National University’s Strategic and Defense Studies Center]: a “Concert of Asia and the Pacific.” However, having been educated at Maoist universities in my 20s, in my darker moments I think that a series of regional conflicts may well be the reality in the years to come.
如果做不到這一點，我希望中美兩國能夠依照我的同事休·懷特(Hugh White)提出的相當理想化的路線，即「亞太協調」(Concert of Asia and the Pacific)來達成諒解。［休·懷特是澳大利亞國立大學戰略與國防研究中心戰略研究學教授。］然而，作為一個20多歲時曾在信奉毛澤東思想的大學裡接受過教育的人，我有時候會比較陰暗地想，一系列地區衝突很有可能是未來幾年的現實。
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