2015年6月23日 星期二

習近平 (3): the ‘Chairman of Everything’; 挑戰習近平(江春男);香港民主示威的挑戰NYTimes;華盛頓郵報Why Hong Kong’s protests are a very big deal


In China under President Xi Jinping, decision-making has become top-down, more rushed and far less predictable.
Here's the latest "China's World" column by Andrew Browne.
Jarring decisions, sometimes messily reversed, have reverberated across China as Xi Jinping—or as one observer dubs him, the ‘Chairman of Everything’—does away with consensus at the top.
WSJ.COM|由 ANDREW BROWNE 上傳





司馬觀點:挑戰習近平(江春男)

2014年10月03日




梁振英對付佔中示威的錦囊妙計,就是學習葉名琛的精神,採取「不動武、不妥協、不對話」的三不政策,打消耗戰,大家一起耗下去,看誰撐得久。這招不登大雅之堂,但也不算賤招。
消耗戰對佔中不利,因為群眾運動有一定規律:首先,它會產生鐘錶效應,港人重視法治,反佔中隨時會走出來。第二,憤怒與激情容易失控,示威者內部很快分裂。第三,有心人搞破壞,製造事端,藉機抹黑。第四,影響民生交通,打擊商業,引起巿民反感。
佔中已經過了好幾天,大家又疲累又煩躁,但是示威現場秩序井然,學生還做垃圾分類,和其他「顏色革命」不可同日而語。梁振英一直躲在裡面,不願出面與學生對話,港人罵他縮頭王八,《人民日報》卻誇他表現傑出,這是他得到的最大肯定,說來辛酸。 

警察形象一夕崩解

警察可說是佔中的最大輸家,警察使用催淚彈、向巿民噴辣椒水,在全球媒體反覆放送。數十年來,警匪電影所塑造出來的正義形象,在佔中運動一夕崩解,短期間無法恢復。香港社會矛盾日益尖銳化,警方如失去公眾信賴,後果嚴重。
佔中激化香港社會的各種矛盾,佔中與反佔中,富豪與中產,本地人與內地人。尤其佔中與反佔中兩派劍拔弩張,各搬救兵,一派有國際聲援,一派有北京當靠山。中共最擅長政治鬥爭,用土共制民主派,用文革手法把香港搞得烏煙瘴氣,指日可待。
習近平保持政治高度,對佔中不輕易發言。但是香港走到今天,這筆帳最後一定會算在他身上。他大權一把抓,責任也要一肩擔。他對國防、外交、新疆、東海、南海,都很強勢,香港佔中才沒有轉圜餘地。
習近平集大權於一身,又因大力反貪,黨內樹敵甚多,他們躲在暗處,伺機反撲。一國兩制是鄧小平傑作,不容被踐踏,如今出了佔中,如何善後,不僅這對他的領導能力是一大考驗,對其領導權威更是重大挑戰。 

China Has Limited Tools to Use to Quell Hong Kong Protests

Analysts say President Xi Jinping of China will need to find a solution that keeps Hong Kong stable without sparking copycat calls for change in mainland China.

香港民主示威對習近平構成挑戰

周一,香港數以千計的親民主示威者繼續抗議。
Chris Mcgrath/Getty Images
周一,香港數以千計的親民主示威者繼續抗議。
北京——中國共產黨平息騷亂的經驗豐富。多年來,它嫻熟地綜合利用言論審查、逮捕、武裝力量,並越來越多地通過金錢,來壓制或緩和政治改革的呼聲。
然而,面對香港街頭日漸壯大的示威陣勢,中國國家主席習近平能拿出的工具似乎相當匱乏。這些抗議活動的訴求,是要在香港的土地上實行更多民主。
香港已經是一個成熟而富裕的特殊地區,變得相對不受共同繁榮的美好承諾的影響。在中國統治下的16年里,這種共同繁榮幫助香港保持了穩定。同時,在這個有着自己的法律和自由傳統的前英國殖民地,嚴厲鎮壓主要是和平性質的抗議,幾乎必然會適得其反,尤其是在國際社會的關注之下。
「在大陸,只要能用足夠多的軍人和武器控制住街道,就能扼殺抗議,因為其他地方都已經被控制了:媒體、互聯網、學校、每塊地方和每個社區,」在台灣國立政治大學做訪問學者的大陸作家笑蜀說。「在香港,不像大陸,街頭並非唯一的戰場。」
在香港的抗議活動中,示威者不顧警方的鎮壓,周一佔領了商務區的一大片地方。這場抗議已經演變為大規模的對峙,而習近平幾乎沒有可以化解的簡易辦法。
大陸的分析人士稱,香港主權回歸中國的年頭,如今已經較為長久了,因而即便是小小的讓步,也可能會向口岸另一邊發出「大規模抗議會有所收穫」的信號——習近平似乎決意避免這種軟弱的跡象。
然而,動用武力驅散抗議者的任何嘗試,都不可避免地會引起與1989年北京的民主抗議人士遭屠戮的類比。當時的事件導致共產黨內部發生分化,並在接下來的多年時間裡影響了中國與外界的關係。
因此,香港的未來或許在很大程度上取決於習近平是否有拿出一套合適解決方案的實力、技巧和視野。這套方案需要既能讓香港保持穩定,又不會讓離北京更近的地方出現仿效香港的改革呼聲。
「這已經遠遠超出了北京或香港當局預想的規模,」斯坦福大學胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution at Stanford University)研究民主發展的高級研究員拉里·戴蒙德(Larry Diamond)說。「他們沒有和平化解此事的策略,因為那需要進行談判,而我認為習近平主席不會允許那麼做。現在,如果讓步,他就會給人軟弱的感覺,他顯然很不喜歡這樣。」
迄今為止,習近平的表現——堅決反對政治自由化和公眾抗議已經成為其統治的一項標誌——表明,他討厭做出讓步。他把自己塑造成了一個強人,一個毛澤東和鄧小平時代過後,中國未曾出現過的那種強人。即使有,也只是極少數的黨內人士和政治分析人士預計,他會認真考慮在香港實行充分民主選舉的訴求。
事實上,他的強人風格或許正是這場危機的誘因之一。
抗議者要求公開選舉香港的最高領導人——行政長官。中國已經同意從2017年開始,允許對該職位進行普選。
但上月,中國的橡皮圖章立法機構排除了對選舉條例進行任何開放競選改革的可能性,不允許未經一個高度親北京的委員會篩選的候選人參選。此外,儘管目前或許依然有妥協的空間,但習近平上周與來自香港的商業領袖舉行閉門會晤,期間重申中共不會允許有720萬人口的前英國殖民地香港進行政治改革。
「假如他在握有優勢的時候進行了談判,」戴蒙德說,「推行在香港實現『漸進有序』的民主進步的策略,哪怕是遵循比民主派所希望的更漸進的時間表,他應該已經預先阻止了這場風暴。」
然而,北京方面一味強化立場。周一晚間,黨報《人民日報》在其網站發表評論文章稱,香港的動蕩,是由赴英美尋求境外「反華勢力」支持、向台獨學運分子學習抗爭經驗的民主激進分子煽動裹挾的。文中稱他們是「一群心系殖民統治、醉心『西方民主』的人。」
如果是中國內地爆發的抗議活動,這樣嚴厲的措辭或許意味着官方即將下令動用武力,然後就是逮捕、審判秀及長期監禁的處罰。
然而值得懷疑的是,這種選擇在香港是否行得通。鑒於大量民眾湧入街頭,又沒有任何政治解決方案,或許只有訴諸像1989年天安門屠殺事件那種級別的武力,才能鎮壓此次抗議活動。但此類流血事件會極大地破壞共產黨的執政合法性,並危及香港的全球金融中心地位。
在中國內地,部署身穿綠色制服的武警——專門進行人群管控的准軍事部隊——基本上能夠確保平息抗議活動。全國各地的官員,從西藏自治區到毗鄰香港的廣東省,經常動用這一策略。但周一,親北京的香港領導層決定撤回警力,似乎承認了他們立即訴諸武力是錯誤之舉。
曾在黨報《學習時報》擔任編輯的鄧聿文表示,習近平亦有其他理由不答應抗議者的要求:任何實質性讓步都可能在大陸激起由其他問題而發起的集會。
鄧聿文表示,香港的活動人士及學生「尚不了解,中央政府不會只根據香港的情況來處理香港問題。」
他說,「他們用整個中國的眼光來看待香港問題。他們擔心香港的反抗活動會在內地重演。我認為『佔中』沒有想到這一點。」佔中運動指的是要求民主的先鋒團體「讓愛與和平佔領中環」。
如果習近平選擇妥協,還是有些餘地。
一個選擇是,撤換親民主派非常反感的現任行政長官梁振英(Leung Chun-ying)。抗議人士幾乎一致要求他下台。周一,在一條街道上,抗議者將一輛大巴裝飾成類似梁振英棺材的模樣。在其他一些地方,人們對印有梁振英頭像的紙板大加斥責。
此舉或許足以削弱抗議者的聲勢,儘管不大可能滿足他們的要求。倘若梁振英下台,北京方面幾乎肯定會安插一個同樣親共的人選。
另一個選擇是,允許民眾投票選出提名委員會逾1200名委員中的所有或大部分人,然後再由他們遴選出幾名參加普選的行政長官候選人。
笑蜀表示,「我覺得大多數香港市民會支持這一方案,而且這也符合《基本法》。」他所說的《基本法》指的是香港的憲法架構。
北京或許還可以採取其他一些手法,表面上更換提名委員會,而實際上不放棄控制。但是,就連表面的妥協,也可能超出了習近平的承受範圍。
執政以來,習近平一直告誡黨內官員必須汲取前蘇聯的教訓。蘇聯因為各種各樣的原因而解體,而中國官方認為,其中包括它放鬆了對遠離莫斯科的多個民族地區及東歐衛星國的管控。
黨內文件顯示,提到蘇聯共產黨垮台一事時,習近平說,「最後,竟無一人是男兒,沒什麼人出來抗爭。」
黃安偉(Edward Wong)自北京、儲百亮(Chris Buckley)自香港報道。傅才德(Michael Forsythe)自紐黑文對本文有報道貢獻。Mia Li自北京對本文有研究貢獻。

*****華盛頓郵報
Why Hong Kong’s protests are a very big deal
 September 29 at 5:04 PM  


The protests taking place in the heart of Hong Kong, Asia's most prominent financial center, present what some commentators consider the biggest challenge to Beijing since the 1989 Tiananmen protests. For two consecutive nights, protesters have massed in some of the city's busiest areas and refused to budge despite police firing multiple rounds of tear gas to disperse the crowds.
The immediate impetus for the demonstrations is new measures proposed by China's authorities that would limit who Hong Kongers can elect in 2017 elections. But the political earthquake shaking the former British colony is centered on a far deeper fault line: the struggle for freedom and democracy in China and the ability for Beijing's authoritarian rulers to cope with the aspirations of 7 million Hong Kongers. Here's what you need to know.
What is the relationship between Hong Kong and China?
Hong Kong, which comprises a number of islands and a coastal strip east of southern China's Pearl River Delta, was a British colony for more than a century and a half before a negotiated deal between London and Beijing handed the territory over to China in 1997. It became a "Special Administrative Region" (SAR) of China under a unique set of conditions, dubbed "one country, two systems": Hong Kongers were granted a range of freedoms far greater than what is allowed on the Chinese mainland. The city maintains its own immigration and customs policy, its own police force, courts and laws, modeled in part on what existed in colonial times. The British also extracted a somewhat nebulous guarantee from the Chinese that Hong Kong would be permitted a "high degree of autonomy" for 50 years after its return to China.
Despite the fears of many doom-mongers, Hong Kong after 1997 remained much the same as Hong Kong before the handover. It was administered by China but with a long leash: Hong Kongers commemorate the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen protests every year with mass vigils and marches. Freedom of press and assembly has been preserved, and the city still gets top marks in the region for its rule of law and protection of human rights. Hong Kong has something of a democratic political system, with myriad political parties taking up seats in a legislative assembly that, while beholden to Beijing's interests, is not wholly cowed by them.
But in recent years, Hong Kongers have grown increasingly concerned with China's long shadow and fear that Beijing will steadily undermine the SAR's unique freedoms and dismantle the "one country, two systems" model. Recent protests have highlighted attacks on Hong Kong's freedom of speech as well as the growing influx and influence of mainlanders in the territory. Hong Kongers, many of whom are first- or second-generation descendants of Chinese who fled Communist rule, see themselves in some respects as a people apart from the rest of China. It all came to a head earlier this month when Beijing announced that Hong Kong's next leader, known as the chief executive, would come only from a slate of candidates vetted by Chinese authorities ahead of planned elections in 2017.
Who are the protesters?
The protests have involved a convergence of various movements: the organizers who launched #OccupyCentral, Hong Kong's (in many ways more successful) equivalent of the U.S. Occupy Wall Street movement, which was directed as much at the city's own business elites as it was at Beijing; Hong Kong's traditional pro-democracy groups, including many that are active during annual June 4 protests; and a huge outpouring of university and high school students, galvanized by the arrest on Friday of a 17-year-old student leader.
They are calling for the resignation of Hong Kong's current chief executive, Leung Chun-ying, considered by critics to be a Beijing proxy, and want to see free, direct elections allowed in the territory. They say they plan to press these demands through peaceful civil disobedience. The protests have been marked by propriety and peacefulness, with activists recycling trash in the middle of demonstrations and school kids dutifully doing their homework while conducting a sit-in.
How is Beijing reacting to this?
Awkwardly. China's state media censored news of the protests, while authorities also blocked access to social media sites such as Instagram, on which Hong Kong protest hashtags were trending. They also condemned the "unlawful occupation actions" taking place in Hong Kong andsuggested a foreign hand was guiding radicals mobilizing in the streets. Leung has branded the protests "illegal" and urged Hong Kongers toengage in "rational" dialogue with their local government.

What will happen next?
The protests appear to be growing. Wednesday and Thursday mark a national holiday in China, and many expect what takes place on those days to define the current unrest. If the sit-ins and demonstrations continue with the intensity they've already shown, there's a chance that local security forces could crack down more violently than they have so far, including perhaps using rubber bullets. That sort of violent response could be a disaster for Hong Kong's government, which would face mounting pressure from the territory's voluble civil society and media.


For China's rulers, the choices seem more clear. They've already signaled their lack of interest in allowing a true democracy to flourish in Hong Kong. State media in the past have pointed to the arrogance and "racism" of Hong Kong's anti-Chinese activists; an influential Chinese commentator notoriously labeled Hong Kongers "dogs of British imperialists." China is unlikely to allow the protesters to win many concessions.
For many years now, optimists have seen Hong Kong's present as China's future. Just as its capitalistic dynamism helped incubate economic transformations that spread from nearby south China through the rest of the mainland, Hong Kong's more open political system was supposed to be a guide for a liberalizing China. The current unrest will test whether that narrative has any truth — or if the former British colony will remain a thorny exception to a Chinese leadership wholly bent on consolidating its grip on power.


Ishaan Tharoor writes about foreign affairs for The Washington Post. He previously was a senior editor at TIME, based first in Hong Kong and later in New York.
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