2025年8月26日 星期二

一些反思 1986年挑戰者號災難報告(也稱為羅傑斯委員會報告)


by WP Rogers1986Cited by 1 — The Commission concluded that the cause of the Mission 51-L accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right solid rocket motor ...
Jun 6, 1986 — The way to deal with a failure of this magnitude is to disclose all the facts fully and openly; to take immediate steps to correct mistakes that.
The report was approved by the Committee on Oc- tober 7, 1986. The ... failure of the joint was due to a faulty design, and that neither NASA nor.
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Feynman reported that, though he had believed he was making discoveries about the problems ... NASA had failed to learn many of the lessons of Challenger. In ...

陳寬仁教授



1986年挑戰者號災難報告(也稱為羅傑斯委員會報告)指出,右側固體火箭助推器 (SRB) 接頭中一個 O 形密封圈失效是事故的直接原因。報告詳細說明了發射當天的低溫如何損壞密封圈,導致熱氣體逸出並燒穿外部燃料箱,最終導致結構性損壞和太空梭解體。該委員會還強調了 NASA 內部的組織和決策失誤,例如安全系統不足以及迫於緊迫的發射時間表的壓力,這些都是促成事故發生的因素。


您可以觀看此視頻,了解更多關於挑戰者號災難以及 NASA 忽視的警告:

Key Findings of the Rogers Commission Report
  • Mechanical Failure:
    The primary cause was a failure in the O-rings sealing the aft field joint of the right SRB. 
  • Design Flaw:
    The O-ring design was flawed, being too sensitive to cold temperatures, which prevented the seal from functioning correctly during the Challenger's cold launch day. 


  • External Tank Breach:
    The escaping hot gases from the faulty joint created a breach in the external fuel tank, leading to its eventual failure. 
  • Aerodynamic Breakup:
    The structural failure of the external tank exposed the orbiter to severe aerodynamic forces, causing the Challenger to break up. 
  • Organizational Culture:
    The commission also pointed to NASA's organizational culture, characterized by scheduling pressures, excessive overtime, and a flawed safety and decision-making process, as significant contributing factors to the tragedy. 
How the Accident Unfolded
  1. 1. Ignition and Liftoff:
    On January 28, 1986, the Challenger launched, but the extremely cold conditions affected the O-ring in the SRB joint. 
  2. 2. O-ring Failure:
    The O-ring failed to properly seal, allowing hot gases to leak out of the booster at the joint. 
  3. 3. Fuel Tank Breach:
    This leak burned through the external fuel tank, causing a structural failure. 
  4. 4. Breakup:
    The vehicle's structural integrity was compromised, leading to its violent breakup 73 seconds after launch. 
Impact of the Report
  • Program Rescope:
    The accident led to a significant restructuring of the Space Shuttle program to improve crew safety. 
  • Safety Improvements:
    It prompted NASA to implement stronger safety measures and review its management and decision-making processes. 
  • Loss of Crew:
    All seven astronauts aboard the Challenger were killed, a tragic loss that deeply affected the United States and the global space community. 

羅傑斯委員會報告的主要發現

機械故障:

主要原因是右側固體火箭推進器尾部密封接頭的O形環失效。

設計缺陷:

O形圈設計有缺陷,對低溫過於敏感,導緻密封件在挑戰者號冷發射日無法正常運作。

外部燃料箱破裂:

從故障接頭逸出的熱氣體導致外部燃料箱破裂,最終導致其失效。

氣動解體:

外部燃料箱的結構故障使軌道器暴露在強大的氣動載荷作用下,導致挑戰者號解體。

組織文化:

委員會也指出,NASA的組織文化,包括日程安排壓力、過度加班以及有缺陷的安全和決策流程,是導致悲劇的重要因素。

事故進展

1. 點火升空:

1986年1月28日,挑戰者號發射升空,但極端寒冷的天氣影響了助推器(SRB)接頭的O形環。

2. O形圈失效:

O形環未能正確密封,導致助推器接頭處高溫氣體洩漏。

3. 燃料箱洩漏:

洩漏燒穿了外部燃料箱,造成結構性損壞。

4. 解體:

航天器的結構完整性受損,導致其在發射後73秒劇烈解體。

報告影響

專案範圍調整:

這次事故導致太空梭計畫進行重大重組,以提高機組人員的安全性。

安全改進:

這促使美國太空總署實施更嚴格的安全措施,並審查其管理和決策流程。

機組人員罹難:

挑戰者號上的七名太空人全數罹難,這場悲劇性的損失深深影響了美國乃至全球航太界。



當異常變得不再令人驚訝,當制度性破壞沒有被即時制止,那麼整個社會將逐步滑向民主的崩解。川普的影響,已經不只存在於語言或態度上,而是深入教育、司法、經濟、移民等制度層面。例如取消留學生簽證、打壓司法獨立、干預FBI調查、限制大學自治權、甚至利用選區劃分鞏固政權等措施,正在侵蝕美國憲政精神與三權分立制度。
諷刺的是,在這些行為逐漸變本加厲的同時,美國股市卻創新高,讓不少人誤以為「經濟好就沒事」,忽視了背後制度崩解的危機。
社會學者戴安娜·沃恩(Diane Vaughan)曾以「逸脫的常態化」來形容這種現象——就像NASA在1986年挑戰者號爆炸前,長期忽略火箭瑕疵,最終釀成悲劇。這種將異常合理化的現象,不只發生在航太、金融或企業,也正潛伏在政治制度中。



Richard Feynman Dead at 69; Leading Theoretical Physicist
By James Gleick
Feb. 17, 1988
理查.費訃聞 紐約時報
《理查.費曼:天才的軌跡》、黃小玲.李靜宜譯 牛頓 1993.
Genius: The Life and Science of Richard Feynman (1992) is a biography of the American physicist Richard Feynman by James Gleick.

 And when the space shuttle Challenger exploded shortly after it was launched on Jan. 28, 1986, Dr. Feynman joined the Presidential commission investigating the disaster. His co-commissioners soon found that it was hard to keep track of him.

Sometimes, with the commission meeting in full session, he would be missing. Later it would turn out that he had been conducting a private investigation, prowling around Cape Canaveral, Fla., questioning engineers and looking at the rocket boosters in storage.

1986年1月28日,挑戰者號太空梭發射後不久爆炸,費曼博士加入了調查這起災難的總統委員會。他的同事很快就發現,很難找到他的蹤跡。


有時,在委員會全體會議期間,他會失蹤。後來人們發現,他一直在進行私人調查,在佛羅裡達州卡納維拉爾角附近徘徊,詢問工程師,並查看倉庫裡的火箭助推器。


That did not sit well with the chairman, William P. Rogers, who wanted an ''orderly investigation.'' Nor did Mr. Rogers like Dr. Feynman's habit of heading for the television cameras to share his findings.

At the hearings themselves, his hair often disheveled, Dr. Feynman ambushed witnesses from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with aggressive questioning. Then, on Feb. 11, as a piece of O ring material was being passed from commissioner to commissioner, he quietly asked for ice water.

The rubbery O ring provided the critical seal in the rocket booster, and was designed to block the escape of hot gas from the joint connecting the individual rocket segments. Its ability to perform when cold was coming under sharp scrutiny.

As Dr. Feynman expected, when he cooled the rubbery material and squeezed it with a clamp, it failed to spring back into shape. Mr. Rogers saw what was coming, and a few minutes later, at the lunch break, he turned to the astronaut Neil Armstrong and said, ''Feynman is becoming a real pain.'' Material Found Vulnerable

After the break, Dr. Feynman brought the crowded hearing room to dead silence by addressing Lawrence B. Mulloy, the former chief of the solid rocket booster program: ''I took this stuff that I got out of your seal and I put it in ice water, and I discovered that when you put some pressure on it for a while and then undo it, it doesn't stretch back. It stays the same dimension. In other words, for a few seconds at least and more seconds than that, there is no resilience in this particular material when it is at a temperature of 32 degrees.''

這讓主席威廉·P·羅傑斯(William P. Rogers)很不滿意,他希望調查「有序進行」。羅傑斯先生也不喜歡費曼醫師走到電視攝影機前分享調查結果的習慣。


在聽證會上,費曼博士經常頭髮凌亂,他用咄咄逼人的提問突襲了美國國家航空暨太空總署(NASA)的證人。然後,在2月11日,當一塊O形圈材料在委員之間傳遞時,他悄悄地要了冰水。


橡膠O形環是火箭助推器中的關鍵密封件,其設計目的是阻止熱氣體從連接各個火箭段的接頭處逸出。它在低溫下的性能受到了嚴格的審查。


正如費曼博士所料,當他冷卻橡膠材料並用夾子擠壓它時,它並沒有恢復原狀。羅傑斯先生預見了即將發生的事。幾分鐘後,午休時,他轉向宇航員尼爾·阿姆斯特朗說:“費曼真是讓人頭疼。” 材料易受損傷


午休後,費曼博士對前固體火箭助推器項目負責人勞倫斯·B·馬洛伊發表講話,令擁擠的聽證會現場鴉雀無聲:“我把從密封件中取出的東西放進冰水中,發現當你對它施加壓力一段時間後再鬆開它時,它不會回彈。它會保持相同的尺寸。換句話說,在32甚至幾秒鐘說,在32的溫度下。


Dr. Feynman and others concluded that if the space agency had conducted the same experiment and acted on the results, the disaster could have been avoided. When the commission finished its work, Mr. Rogers was barely able to prevail upon Dr. Feynman not to dissent from the report.

But he held a separate news conference to deliver a harsh and independent verdict: that NASA had ''exaggerated the reliability of the space shuttle to the point of fantasy.''

費曼博士和其他人得出結論,如果NASA進行了同樣的實驗並根據結果採取行動,這場災難本可以避免。委員會完成工作後,羅傑斯先生勉強說服費曼醫生不反對報告。


但他召開了另一場新聞發布會,發表了嚴厲而獨立的裁決:NASA「誇大了太空梭的可靠性,簡直到了不切實際的地步」。


即便如此,費曼醫師也已經開始與癌症抗爭,並於週一去世。

Even then, Dr. Feynman had begun a struggle with the cancer that killed him Monday.

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