2025年2月13日 星期四

Paparo上將(美軍印太司令部司令)以軍演作為掩護,對台發動攻擊。。美国北方司令部司令 UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND. AND. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE吉洛特将军(Gregory Guillot)周四在参议院军委会的一场听证会上对参议员表示,他对大量中国人从加州非法越境的意图感到担忧。


Joe:「我不知道中國會不會真的軍武襲擊台灣,不過俄羅斯侵略烏克蘭戰爭以前,美國也一直警告,但烏克蘭覺得不可能真的發生」
美軍印太司令部司令Paparo上將表示,中國在台灣週邊的軍事演習已經變得如此廣泛,研判中方很快就能以軍演作為掩護,對台發動攻擊。Paparo並表示,美軍需要加速取得並部署各式的無人系統,而人工智慧將成為幫助美國改善潛在攻台行動早期預警能力的「關鍵工具」,Samuel Paparo是在夏威夷「檀香山防衛論壇」(Honolulu Defense Forum)作此表述,Paparo說,近年來,解放軍在台灣週邊的活動明顯增加,這使得區分大規模演習和實際的攻擊準備變得更加困難。他並表示,目前已經「非常接近」那個程度,即共軍軍演很可能是作為掩蓋作戰警訊的「遮羞布」。
Paparo直言,共軍目前在台灣週邊侵略性的演習,其實不是其所稱的「演習」,而是「彩排」──為了脅迫台灣與中國統一的彩排,美國軍聞網站《防務一號》(Defense One)報導,Paparo表示,中國僅在本月就已向台灣派遣多個間諜氣球、海軍艦艇和軍機——是為脅迫統一台灣做彩排。Paparo並強調,中國日益複雜的多領域行動,顯示其明確的意圖,以及不斷提升的能力,Paparo2021年指揮美國太平洋艦隊時,中國軍隊派出1個旅進行了夏季演習。隔年,演習規模擴大到6個旅。他說到了2024年夏天,中國派出42個旅、150艘海軍艦艇和200艘兩棲攻擊艦進行軍演,練習突破障礙、並在城市地形演練軍事行動,Paparo對中國日益增強的軍事活動也表示擔憂,並稱美國必須加速彌補關鍵差距,例如增加在印太區域可運用的武器數量。
報導,美國國防官員擔憂,一旦台海戰爭爆發,美方恐沒有足夠武器應對。Paparo也在論壇表示,美軍的彈藥庫即將用罄,維護軍備工作的積壓量每月都在增加,而容錯空間卻越來越小,「我們的對手看到了這些漏洞,並且正在積極利用它們」,Paparo另表示,美軍需要加速取得並部署各式的無人系統。他說,人工智慧(AI)將成為幫助美國改善潛在攻台行動早期預警能力的「關鍵工具」,Paparo過去曾主張,美國應大幅提升自主系統產能並部署於台灣海峽、建構「地獄景象」(hellscape) ,以嚇阻或破壞中國侵台行動,Paparo也警告,單靠科技無法贏得戰鬥,美國也需要迅速改革其採購系統與國防國防官僚機構,他說。 「採購的速度要與戰鬥速度同步,而不是與委員會速度同步。」
解放軍東部戰區在台灣周邊海域執行一場實兵演習,其中在台灣周邊海域執行戰備警巡任務的海軍淮北艦,進行實兵對抗演練。艦上官兵表示,「我們在執行戰備警巡任務的時候,都時刻保持『箭滿弦、彈滿倉』狀態,武器系統也是處於發射準備狀態,隨時可以擊發。」不僅如此,中國央視報導還曝光一段淮北艦人員向我方宜陽艦「喊話」的畫面,說「元宵節是我們兩岸中國人的傳統節日,值此佳節之際,祝你們和你們的家人元宵節快樂。」他還撂一段台語,「順風順水攏吉利,團團圓圓嘸代誌。」
美國海軍驅逐艦「強生號」 (USS Ralph Johnson)和海軍勘測船「鮑迪奇號」(USNS Bowditch)於2月10日至12日從北到南航行。解放軍東部戰區痛批,美方行徑傳遞錯誤信號、增加安全風險。
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“我所担心的是有披着羊皮的狼进入,打算伤害我们,” 美国北方司令部司令吉洛特将军(Gregory Guillot)周四在参议院军委会的一场听证会上对参议员表示,他对大量中国人从加州非法越境的意图感到担忧。出席作证的南方司令部司令霍尔西上将(Alvin Holsey)也表示,虽然今年以来通过达连隘口的中国人数量大幅下降,但美国会继续加强监控。


GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE. COMMANDER. UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND. AND. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE


 People’s Republic of China (PRC) The PRC remains the Department’s pacing challenge as identified in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Beijing has embarked on a wide-ranging military modernization program that is advancing the PRC’s homeland-threatening capabilities at an urgent pace. At the strategic level, the PRC is pursuing a rapid quantitative and qualitative expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which now numbers over 500 operational warheads and is on pace to exceed 1,000 by UNCDEFENSE

the end of the decade. The PRC probably intends to place a significant portion of these weapons
– including over 300 newly constructed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos – in a
launch-on-warning posture that could increase the risk of miscalculation in a crisis or conflict.
Beijing’s strategic modernization program includes a variety of novel weapons designed
to bolster the credibility of the PRC’s strategic deterrent by ensuring its ability to overcome U.S.
missile defenses and retaliate following a strike. These weapons include ICBMs equipped with
hypersonic glide vehicles, whose high speed, low trajectory, and maneuvering capabilities
challenge our ability to detect, characterize, and warn of inbound threats. The PRC is also
developing a fractional orbital bombardment system, designed to further challenge our early
warning radars and ballistic missile interceptors.
The Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress on PRC military developments
states that the PRC may also be exploring the development of conventionally armed
intercontinental-range missile systems that could allow Be

The Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress on PRC military developments states that the PRC may also be exploring the development of conventionally armed intercontinental-range missile systems that could allow Beijing to strike targets in Alaska and the continental United States without crossing the nuclear threshold. Such systems, if fielded, would further erode strategic stability by challenging our ability to characterize an inbound attack and complicating our decision-making about an appropriate response. Turning to the maritime domain, in the last two years, the PRC has launched the first two hulls of its new Shang III class of nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN). If the PRC arms the Shang III with land-attack cruise missiles, the new SSGNs could provide Beijing a clandestine land-attack option beyond the Indo-Pacific region, potentially holding at risk critical infrastructure in Alaska and the U.S. West Coast. While Beijing’s intent for employing these long-range conventional strike capabilities is not fully known, in a future c crisis, the PRC could use these weapons – along with its world-class offensive cyber capabilities – to threaten or attack UNCLASSIFIED 6 our critical defense infrastructure in an attempt to dissuade or frustrate our force flows across the Pacific and degrade the effectiveness of our forward combat operations. Meanwhile, the PRC continues to expand its influence and activity in the A


Meanwhile, the PRC continues to expand its influence and activity in the Arctic. Last summer, Beijing again employed its Xue Long 2 ice-hardened research vessel to conduct the country’s 13th scientific expedition to the Arctic. During its voyage, the vessel deployed autonomous underwater vehicles, floating ice stations, and an acoustic monitoring buoy system in waters off Alaska and Canada to collect data that could inform future PLA Navy deployments to the region. Concurrently, the PRC and Russia conducted their second combined naval patrol to the Bering Sea in as many years. More than 10 vessels – including cruise missile-capable surface combatants – participated in the patrol, which included anti-submarine exercises and other combat training near the Aleutian Islands. 

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